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CHAPTER I. PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE. 
Philos-ophy seeks a rational interpretation of life. Its problems are 
those of our finite existence. However much philosophy may lead us to 
t he affirmation of the Divine Mind as the only sufficient ground of 
reality,it can give us no psychology of the Divine • The theistic 
view leads us to affirm an Infinite Creator and the world as his crea-
tion, but how the Creator creates is quite beyond. the power of phil-
osophy to say. This much we must agree on a t the very stfart. 
It is -. Hu,ma.n life there fore,-our life,which is the prime subject of 
philosophical enquiry. A rational s peculation starting from the facts 
of life and proceeding along logical lines does indeed lead us to the 
idea of God and of his relation to the world of finite persons and 
thi ngs, but what speculation is thus led to affirm about God is affirm-
ed primarily for the sake of a better understanding of our life and 
thought as they stand related to the Divine as ground. And philosophy 
does not proceed very far before the limits of human thought are reach 
ed. Mysteries abound; we see through the glass darkly or as Paul has 
it,in fragmentary fashion; but we see.and that is the important matter 
and because we see we may ask How? and Why? But it behooves the stud-
--- - ent of philosophy to remember that the horizons of our knowledge are 
not free from shadows, and that while philosophy can point us to the 
heights from which we may look over and catch glimpses of a realm 
beyond, we are not there but here ; and when we reach those celestial 
spheres we shall doubtless not need philosophy. But mystery must re-
main as long as finite intelligence grapples with eternal truth. 
--
Philosophy cannot banish mystert. Let us freely confess all this at 
the outset,in order that we may understand ourselves and our problem 
and be saved from attempting the impossible or lamenting the incom-
plete answers hich we find ourselves compelled to give to the great 
questions which loom up before the enquiring spirit. 
In one important respect the beginnings of systematic thought 
among the ancient Greek philosophers were truer to human life than 
most of the modern speculative drifts . It is this: the principle in-
terests for Socrates and Plato were those of the moral life of men. 
Of the problems of cognition they were by no means ignorant. The Pro-
--tagorean theory of knowledge had pointed out thus early the necessar-
ily relative element in all human knowing. The impossibility of grasp-
ing reality ·except by the subjective processes of the individual 
thinker seemed to them to m~~e an objectively valid knowledge impos-
sible • These ancient giants of t11ought did precisely what Kant did 
two thousand years later,-they showed that the moral life of man was 
a matter of the first importance and must be re~koned with if philos-
ophy was to concern human life at all. They demanded and assumed the 
objec t of thought not so much because they could justify it but be-
cause philosophy could not go on Ylithout it,and the moral. needs of· man 
demand that philosophy should go on. The moral consciousness appears 
thus as it has since appeared as the prime speculative postulate. 
And in this they were rtght,and so were Descartes,Kant and 
Jacobi, and the others who have recognized the other elements in our 
conscious life besides rationality. The moral element in our lif e is 
not distinctively human than the rational. Both are in reality intim-
ately related, but the problems arising from the one and from the 
other are sufficiently distinct to justify a logical separa.tio.n, for 
the purposes of our thinking. Modern philosophy has been l a.rgely con-
cerned with the problems of knowledge. Metaphysics and Ethics have fol 
lowed as important corollaries from the major epistemological problem. 
This is correct so far as the proper order for our tr_inking is con-
cerned is concerned. Metaphysics must indeed be approached along the 
highway of the theory of thought and knowledge . But modern philosophy 
in devoting itself so exclusively to the problemsof cognition and a 
metaphysics '~ich opens up from them,has lost sight of the great 
truth that the life is more than speculative thought,Tit is will also , 
and will means purpose and action . Rational thinking is not more dis-
tinctive of our life than willing . Conscious life in the brute crea-
tion o:ffers many and interesting problems. Whether the nimals reason 
in a way that involves a recognition of themselves as distinct from 
other animals; how far their actions are the result of what may be 
properly called volitions and not purely automatic; how far an intell-
heknew 
igent dog for instance who certainly acts as if he had done wrong ac-
tually does know it:-these and similar questions aris ing out of the 
facts of animal intelligence, are by no means finally settled .• The 
point to be noted here is that ih contrasting the animal creation 
with humanity,the distinetive difference is even more predominantly 
moral than rational.The foundation stone of rationality is self-con-
sciousness: that of morality self-direction or active volition. 
I tseems a strange fact that modern philosophy did not sooner begin to 
see that our experience is quite as much an affair of 1119t"8.l:;a.e. of ra-
tional insight. 
- -
But there have been thinkers for the past two generations who have 
taken the l arger view of experience and have sought to swing the cur -
rents of speculative thought away from the extreme to which Idealism 
had been pushed by Hegel'. The most significant among these we re , 
cleBiran and Renouvier in France , and in Germany the younger Fichte , 
o/eisse,Ulrici, Lotze,ancl Ritschl. The philosophy of the Absolute was 
succ eede d by a great gust of materialism which blew over Europe in the 
decades following Hegel's death. ,-,This resulted(I)from the f act that 
the practical outc ome of the philosophy of the Absolute ~as soon seen 
to be atheistic and deterministic, ana -( 2J from t he great strides made 
i n natural science. The problem of these thinkers was therefore one of 
mediation as well as reconstruction. Again the old question of the 
true relation of the mind and the wor ld of objective phenomena came up 
but with all the new light which the development of Idealism afforded. 
The fact that the Hegelian philosophy allowed only an i mpersonal view 
of GoO., and consequent l y left no room for belief i n the reality of hu-
man personal ity;wi th its co r ollaries of freedom and i mmortality--
this fact forced these thinkers to whom the interests of Ethics and 
Religion were dear , out of Absolutism into a camp by themselves . 
---- Differing considerabl y , they neverthel ess agreed on t he need of re j ec-
ting determinism and making personality the centre of their systems • 
. ith regard to the divine ,their doctrine was more or less clearly 
the istic;and as regards the finite spirit they stand related metaphys -
ically to Leibnitz ,with his doctrine of free Monads. In ~eisse and the 
younger "Fichte this relationis mo s t clear since they taught that the 
be ing of the Eg o depends on a f ree self-positing. Ulrici also severely 
at t ackeo the Hegelianism determi n ism;but itremained for Lotze to give 
the worl d a profound metaphysical r econciliati on between the extremes 
of Idealism and Materialism. "t ith true insight he declares the dom-
i nating motives of philosophy must be governed by a recognition ofthe 
moral. Purpose is the one great r econciline principle. By r ecogniz-
ing purpose we shall be saved fr om naturalistic det~rminism on the 
one hand and the determinism of the absolute philosophy on yhe other . 
The spir i tualact ivity which is the ground of all reality has for i t s 
end t he good of the wor l d . In nature , efficient cause is indeed. a vast 
correlating principl e , but no view of nature will be found adequat e, 
and espec i ally no view of human life, which does not recognize that 
the fundamental Reality is an i ntelligent act ivityrealizing good ends . 
Thus purposive interaction betwe en the infinite spirit and the uni -
verse, and bet we en the finite s pi rit and things,- this is the fundamen-
tal me t aphys ical principle of unity. Lot ze 's thought system may be 
properly called " teleologi cal ideal ism". 
Rev iewi ng t hen the thought of the past two generations , so far as 
the idealistic stream i s concer ned , 1e recogni ze a universal revolt 
f rom determinism. This has resulted from an enlarged insight into the 
c omplex ity of our human experience . The 'l"'ill has cla imed and received 
cons ideration . The truth has justified itself that volition no less 
than cognition comprises our rational li f e and \·lith volition encl pur-
pose emerges persons.lit~r. But volition and purpose are meaningless as 
we shall see exce pt on the pl ane of freedom. we are thus brought at 
once to the problem of freedom . ·.-.re must justify freedom as a fundament-
al metaphysical postulate. This will be the first step in our expos-
ition of Personalism;and in this justification we shall have need to 
recall some truthswhich have been brought forth pretty clearly in our 
course of study. 
CHA TER II 
THE FAILURE OF NATURALIST IC DETER INISM. 
Our task in this section will be to show that the metaphysics of 
necessity while plainer to superficial thinking is reallt in the end 
far more difficult s.nd obscure than the metaphysics of freedom . 
This.~s the argument will show is because necessitarian systems of 
thought really inrolve consequences highly disastrous to knowledge 
and morality. 
A study of the world of Nature reveals the uniform sequences 
which the law of causalit ie. ~uppo:sed to e:iplain. study of human 
activity reveals freedom as its basal implication, as we shall see. 
Freedom is as fundamental to the moral life as causality is to natural 
science. But it is not the task of moral theory to justify freedom 
any more than it is the business of physics to expound the law of 
causality. This task must be handed ove r to metaphysics . 
Freedom means self-determination--activity of the mind undetermin-
ed by causes external to the mind itsel£ Now ~e have seen how the 
content of cognition is determined by impressions which come from 
without the mind . There iS. therefore a determinism in knowledge. 
' ' \ 
The n i nd ' s free activity may be exerc i sed only withi n the limits 
prescribed by the impress ions received the mind ,-und this under pain 
of falling i nto i l lusion and error . But 1ithin these limits there 
must be a truly subjective element- the mind must freely compare , re-
cognize and pass judgment upon the seasations,making them over into 
perceptions and building these up into knowledgein accordance with 
the fun amental principles of thought . This 'le have seen in our ep-
istemological study. Freedom is therefore a relative matter and we 
are not long in reaching its l i mits . The same is true of freedom v;hen 
approached from the side of th&moral life . That freedom is essential 
i f judgments are to have any moral character i s admitted,but the 
point in dispute here is what does freedom mean? If we think f r eedom 
means an untrammeled independ.ence to ch oose as we please , we are soon 
rounded up by certa in dark facts of heredity(for instance)by which 
it appears that the physical orO,er to a certain extent determines the 
mental . And yet the physical can impose no limitations 'lhich destroy 
that power to choose and act freely which lies at the root of respon-
sibility and gives to conduct its moral character • This much indi cates 
that . the problem of Freedom is a large one and not t o be answered in 
any off- hand way ; and that fteedom always exists within l i mits. 
The acts of a conscious being may b~ 1\completely determinea from 
wi thout ( 2) only partly detremined from VIi thout ( 3) not at a 1 cleter-
mined f rom without. The first is sub- human conscious activity;the s ec 
ond human activity , the thi rd super- human or divine activity . 
Naturally as long as our knowledge rests upon our experience as a 
basis , the amount of_ knowledg.e we ~~_.acquire concerning sub-human con-
scious activity on the one hand ,and super-human conscious activity 
onthe other must be very limited. The great point of dispute then is 
whether Lhuman activity should be separated from all other consc ious 
activity in nature , and whether concerning human activity e are just-
ified in affirming that d.etermination is only partial ; leaving room 
for that spontaneous or originative activity of the conscious spirit 
which vve call freedom. If so, then the foundations are laid for a . c 
philosophy of lif'e.which shall include not only the creative act ivity 
of the m'nd involved i n idealism, but also the free ·ill of the finite 
spirit with its particular and indiviclual volitions and. -pur-p oses in-
volved in personalism. 
A complete or full mechanical eterminism in human activity invol-
ving the automaton theory in ethics no one has the hardihood to affirm 
and carry out. Tts results for moral ity are too i mmediately dis-
astrous . And so determinism is found in some mo ifiea forms which 
happily conceal th~1 true nature from the philoso her. The concealment 
is affect&d through the impostures of language and the dece it of 
time-honored logical f'alls.cies . The se modif'ied. f'orms of' determinism 
are the peculiar ana. priceless po~ession of present day empirical 
psychology. Let us briefly examine them before coming to the main 
discussion in which -e hope to justif y Freedom. 
And the first is that mediating makeshift which has been caller 
''soft aetermirlism'~ It is characteristic of this cLoctrine to a.dmi t with 
the natural ist that the brain states do determine ~hought. There may 
be no dogmatic sta tement that the fornler cause the latter , but such 
emphasis is pla.cea. upon the physical organism >:hen the discussion is 
psychological that cause is the implication . At any rate the physical 
is ta...1ren as antecedent to the psychical . And then when the discussion 
becomes moral there is much disavowing of causality and fine language 
concerning the spiritual nature of everything -brain and mind- activity 
together; in forgetfulness of the fact that no ground has been pro-
vided for this spiritual outlook when once it has been admitted that 
the brain is the determi nant of mental activity , or that we are"child-
ren of the 6osmos" (to use I·-~ . FOUII;LE' S expression) Thus this form of 
"modified" determinism c omplacently makes an admission fatal to free-
dom ana gives away the essential thing to the mechanical philosopher 
when cognition is upfor iscussion ; and turns around and agrees with 
the spiritualist when Ethics comes up . However broad and satisfying 
such a compromise may appear , it is logically impossible. The question 
of the relation of the mind- order to the nature- order is settled 
when the right of way is given to the nature- order; and as Boyce G 
Gibson in Personal Idealism shows , it is not difficult to strip off: 
all the borrowed f'inery of idealism and spiritualism and make the 
doctrine stand forth in its materialistic nakedness, with the con-
sequent disaster to knowledge and theory of morals . 
Another of these half- hearted doctrines of necessity is Indetermin 
ism The indeterminist disputes determinism because it reduces the 
meaning of volition to zero by making it indeed a mental act , but one 
f i xed in the molcls of physical antecedence and consequence ; and of 
course this will not do morally . Om the other hand he will not allow 
that the subject is a free agent . Instead we are assured that matters 
-which have fallen out so and so because of a volition,might have 
fallen out othel~ise just as well ; the volition might have been 
different and the matter consequently different. After all when we 
consider volitions e are on ground quite indeterminate. Their out-
come is al7ays am~iguous and might have been othen1ise. Here the 
m~tter must rest;for rve cannot go further ;-we have gone as far as 
experience allovs us to go. It i s not difficult to see that t hi s 
theory of Indeterminism is a fine way of saying that matters are so 
because .they happen to turn out so. This is about as far as a thi nker 
had better go who (like Prof.James :the chief exponent of this theory) 
i s held. back by t he long since discounted empirical psychology which 
denies exist ence to the self. The theory of Indeterminism offers no 
explanation.It practically tells us simply that acts which result fr om 
volitions might have been different and if the volition had chanced 
to be different , the act would have been different ; and. we cannot tell 
what a volition will bring forth , and t hat is all there is to it ,---
not very important or s atisfying information to s y the least. The in-
determinist bravely leaves tr1e camp of the necessitarians,makes some 
fine flour ishes ,comes to the edge of the realms of free agency · and 
turns back again prevented from entering by his empirical psychology? 
Indeterminism resemblee those other half hearted makeshifts the forms 
of "psycho- physical parallelism" which affirm an order of t hought and 
an order of material change; these parallel OM correspond to each 
other,but thereis no causal c6nnection. But as Prof •. ard whows (in 
vol.II Nat.andAgnosticism) such a position is logicallyvery unstable 
and relapses constantly into mater ialism. To qualify automat ism by 
,, 
the adjective conscious does not save it from those inherent implic-
ations so disastrous to the moral life. Such straddling devices as 
these s erve to conceal for a time the barrehness and poverty of mat-
erialism and in this way avoid outraging tlte moral consciousness; 
while at the same time they stop short of freedom and fail to attain 
to any genuine lY}{ spiritual view of life . Of course tl:e problem of 
freedom is not faced but laid aside and we are bidden not to talk 
any more ab out it under pain of be ing unscientific. Such attempts 
show t he uselessness of trying to split the difference between freedom 
which involves the mind 'soriginative activity and implies purpose, 
and a determinism which binds all act ivity with the iron chain of 
mechanical causation. 
1 e now turn to the argument itself which will take the form not 
of a positive demonstration of freedom-that is impossible,but rather 
the showing how all other pathways land us in the dreary morasses of 
cognitive and moral sceptic1sm. In .this way we propose to justify 
freedom by showing that it ia one of those great basal i mplicatuons 
without which all attempts to understand t he mental and moral life of 
man fall to the ground. 
The Meaning of Freedom. 
In seeking . to find a basis for freedom ,we shall need toturn both to 
psychology and metaphysics. And if we can show that the hypothesis of 
the free spirit of man as a cause of causes of final cause is not ir-
rational , and further if ·we can show that the denial of freedom ends 
in irrationality,we shall have sufficiently justified freedom as a 
fundamental postulate of critical thought,ever though we shall not be 
able to clear the subject of all difficulties . 
In our conscious experienc e we are aware not only of sensations 
which come to us from wi thout,but a l so of want s an esires which 
arise with i n the mind . In classi fying t hese the psycholoe,ist calls 
them by the genera l t erm sensibilities • . 1e are c onscious also of 
certain decisio~s lead i ng to action, which aecisions somehow grow out 
of the i mpulses wants and desires . These dec isions the psycholog ist c 
calls vol i tions . Inseek i ng to find a basis for freedom , we shall need 
to turn both to psychology and me taphysics . And i f v;e can show that 
t he hypothesis of the free spirit of man as a caus e of causes of final 
cause is nay irrational , we shall have suff iciently justified freed om 
as a fundamental postul ate of crit ical thought, even though we shall 
not be able to clear the subject of all difficulties. 
I n our conscious experi ence we are aware not only of sensations 
which come to us from without, but also of wants and desires and im-
pulses which ari s e within the mind. In classify i ng t h es e the psychol-
·ogist calls them by the general term sessibilities . ~e are conscious 
also of ce r tain decisions leading t o action,wh ich dec isions somehow 
grow out of the impulses wants and desires . hese dec isions t h e 
:psycholog ist calls volitions • . 'HEN 1iE SA'! that . ur actions result 
from our will, all agree . But ·:vhen \ e are firm th t this willing 
i s the act of a f ree agent- that volitions are not e f r~ cts of any 
cause but themselves are free causes. ~ e meet the determinest who 
assures us that our belief in our freednm is a plausible delusion 
vhich will bec ome diB~ipated with a l arger knowle dge of s ci entific 
fact. Let us therefore listen to the arguments of determinism agains t 
fr eedom, 
fF ee ,'l em and an:swer them . I n this way we can defend freedom from the 
charge of beinr, irrational or uncritical. Then we can proceed to show 
where determinism l ands us as regards the genesis of retional know-
ledge and the possibility of the moral life. 
(I) ·;;e are t o.ld by the determimist that in human life as in cosmic 
existence the present is the product of the past just as the futRre 
will be the product of the present. ':fe are ~;then reminded that in the 
earlier periods of our existence we were indisputably conditioned by 
physical circumsjances. e r e we not born into the world without our 
will; and were not all those cond.i tions and influences of early life 
which exercise so potent an influence determine for us in advance? 
And. launched thus early upon the sea of circumstance \Ve have never 
found ourselves other than conditioned thereby . The currents about us 
are not of our own direct ing; we find ourselves in them and they bear 
us on. It is therefore delusion. · to say ,,ve are fre e, when we are so 
conditioned by circumstance. Is not a man's life throughout aetermined 
in the same strict physical way that it certainly is in the early 
years of life . .? Is not the i mprovement of the man to be looked for 
through bettere:c1l circums t ances - from without? Then his motives 
will become more elevated and his character will gro ... ~·. ~e are fam-
iliar with this :.... kind of a~gument which seeks to ground ~n atives in 
circumstances and to make character a product of environment . It has 
been often used against the theologian when he has attempted to main-
tain his n unscientific" doctrine of the freedom of the will. It is 
superficial enough but has been brought forth many times in the namw 
of mo dern ec ience . 
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ssu mes agai n tha t a ll phenomena come under its sway . :N o;, we have no 
-quarre l 'l ith the fact that the Naturalist a ssumes , but only v1 i th 
v;hat he assumes . A theory must be tested by its fruits , s.nd 
we have seen again and again in our study what the log ical outcome is 
when causality is assumed as the all inclusive rinciple. ~e have 
to think of the mental as well as the physical life as mechanacally 
determined. Janet In Final Causes drives et erminism to its logical 
limits by insi sting that al l the loop holes be closed up and then 
r~aJx: 
that causality exvl a in all the ay u~ even in the: A . · of intelligenee 
~he nebula, inst inct in animals, ap r:arent purpose in our neighbors, 
and our own ills all come under the one law. Our menta l states -
sensations and sensibilities, percepti ons and volitions succee each 
other like vie-rs on the stereopticon sere ~T,l , ci~t t-Jr ~:i.i1ecl f rom with out. 
To af ~ · irm the determinism as conscious or intellieent does not help 
matters, and the affirma" ion of the mind-series of phenomena and the 
matter-series of phenomena as every ,'here -paral l el but no t causally 
connected is logically untenable. he situation becomes especially 
nesperate· and embarassing hen the facts of the moral li f e come up 
for explanation. Automati sm i s not so apparently isastrous in epis -
t emo loe y - 1::.:ni: i l cT ~ t· ~ 1 ::' sn cr~oYrP- t hat ~~; i th mechanical c1e t er;-nination 
as the only principle of explanation knowledge encls in skepticism. 
But determinism is openly and evi dently fatal in eth ics. I f there-
fore causat i on is the only principle we have to explain interaction 
between the mind-order and the matter-order, we are pretty badl y 
off'. 
Now le t it be remembered that mechanical causation is at best 
not a f act which we read off but a fundamental principle Y!hich Yve hav 
to assume in attempting to connect things in the \VOrld of reality ab-
out us, and the <uestion ~ri~ 
· a . ..:.es vvhy v1 e ma~- not assume another and 
-' 
higher funll ament al L rincipl e ~:;hich may furnish relie f i n those places 
vJhere mechanic al cletermi nat ion leaves us in such a sc;>~rw : p1~g}:lt? .~·~ 
Te leo~ogy is such a principle . Free cause may aff ord explanation 
whe re me chanical cause leaves u s i n the lurch. There is nothling illog-
ical in t he assumption of~anothe ro~hmgher principle for the explanation 
of those f act s \.'hich fie e rminism is powerless to deal with . At the 
s tart one assumption is as good as another and at the finish one assum 
ption may t urn out to be a good eal better than ano her. nc this 
brings us to t he second quest ion, vi z : does mecl1anical causation ex-
plain even on the pl ne of the material? If not , hat v•ill? 
? e remind ourselves again that all that experience g ives of 
causality is the fact of sequence.Two things A and B interact as rre 
suppose causally, is the cause, B i s the effect . 11 we can mean 
by the causal interaction is, action producing some change and all 
effect is t .e change produced. i thout any causal 
we can mean by the ,,~sal-iRte~aet~eB-~s-aet~eR-p~ea~e~Bg-se 
agency A would remain simply A. The l avr of identity requires that . 
Uo ·; if is to act causally and A resulj , A must someho become more 
t~an A in its action,it must transcend i tself,an i n so doing ;hat be -
comes of its ·. identity? But how A can pro duc e is be ona us. Ho ~ an 
antecedent can become a conse uent is unanswreable. It loo s as if a 
cause must i mply its effe ct i norder to be a cause , and c onversely an 
effect imply its cause i n or der to be an effect. But while this may 
betrue logically;for thought , we have no assurance that it is true 
ontologically-for existence . Notions like potentiality o not help . 
To say that A' exists potentially in A is no better than to confes s an 
i nability to answer. For what is this potential exi stenc e , and how does 
')._ \ 
-
it di ffer from actual existence. "Outgoing influences~ "playing f om-ces" 
are feeble crutches of the imaeination and only seem to afford help 
when we make the cause and effect so definite and concrete that the 
imagination has a kind of stage setting for its operations. To imagine 
that "forces play" between two bodies. 7hich mutually attract each other 
is easy but to say that day succeeds night , or summer succeeds spring 
for such reasons is nonsence. Why some particular effect follows some 
particular cause is beyond us. •rre simply know that it does . 
~e might extend the discussion but enough has been said to indicate 
the truth aimed at thatJwechanical causality explains nothing . When 
the causal chain is taken up, we are condemned to an end less regress, 
for no efficent cause furnishes a ground :·. in which the mind can rest. 
Far from invalidating freedom;causality turns out to be a dark inex-
plicable notion and to have no power to afford the mind an explanation 
in which it can rest. Another and. higher prihciple must b"e looked to 
if we are to have explanation and this higher principle is that of free 
cause or the agent in whos e intelligent purpose a real beginning is 
reached. 
In further pointing out the hopeless inadequacy of determinism ;;:e 
~ - have to indicate 
How the Denial of Freedom is Fatal to Knowledge 
The argument is pretty familiar but must be recalled here in outline. 
We have seen how persistently the dualism of subject and object haunts 
every realistic theory of thought . This continues so long as the know-
i ng subject is regarded as a mere cause among causes,for causal c onnec· 
ions on the nature side cannot be defined ot her than as invar iable 
--
·-
sequence , and there is no rest .in this . The complete failure of the 
empirical theory of knowledge has sho,Nn that the human subject does not 
stand in a merely mechanical relation to the world-order, but by virtue 
of his real knowl edge ,his relation to nature is an intelligent one . 
And this intelligent relation demands that the thought-series and the 
thing-series which correspond shall be connected by a higher conception 
than causality. "Free"cause or filJ.ality of purpose is such a higher 
conception and our epistemological study has sho~n that in the last 
analysis thought has to ground itself' in the metaphtsical notion of 
finality . The elimination of one or the other of the elements of the 
dualism is not a reconciliation. It has often been presented as such 
as the history of hpilosophy shows.There is no r econciliatiom of the 
dualism but in this higher notion of finality ,-this is the unifying 
principle . The intelligent subject stands related to the world not 
as dynamical ly determining and itself dynamically determined , but as a 
free cause . 11 things in nature determine each other but the mind of 
man is not a thing in nature , for its sJrnthetic activity in buil ding 
up a universe cannot be explained from without . But this relation of 
all things in nature by the law of their causal interaction , meta-
physics shows to be absolutely inexplicable except on the supposition 
of an Infinite agent whose active purposes are the Cause of causes . 
And likeuise the relation of that part of the natural order of things 
embraced within a single finite experience , metaphysics shows to be 
absolutely inexplicable except by allowing that t he self- distinguish-
i ng subject is not a part of that natural order , but stands without tlH 
order freely determining it within certain limits 
. The subject then 
exerc ises activities which have no antecedents in the objective world 
order bi.lt are "free 11 i . e . self originating . 
The hopeless speculative weakness of determi nism is seen most clearly 
here at the problem of knowledge . 
According to the deterministic t l:eory there is no spontaneous activity 
of the mi nd , for even mental events are determined by antecedents , and 
it makes no d.i f ference whether these ant ecedents are physical condition 
(according to naturalism) or the all inclusive Infin i te (Absolutism) 
the determination is a fact . There can be only menyal occurrences . 
Thus perceptioms are necessitated , and indeed all our ideas and their 
combinations, beliefs , convictions , and the rest . · : e may appear to re-
-
fleet and deliberate and decide , but it is onlt appearance and not real-
ity . The entire contents of our consciousness are effects of some de-
termining cause. ·lfaterlialist ic determinists do not put i t as ba l a.ly 
as tmis, as it shocks common sense , but it i s nevertheless the logic and 
f act of t heir system. Now if our beliefs are necess i tated , then one is 
as good as another while it l asts . There is on choice , nor any standard 
bg which to choose. How can there be , since a stan ard by which t o ac -
cept or reject our beliefs clearly implies i n itself the po ;er to ac -
cept t he standard . And the standard when accepted i mplies the abil ity 
freely to compare beliefswhivh may arise with the standard , rejecting 
some and aecepting others. 
But all this is contrary to the deterministic hypothesis . Thuoght be-
comes a consequenc e of some antecedents which are quite beyond us . 
But error is one of the facts of experience . IT e do have perceptions 
which turn out to be unverif i able by a return of t he sensation ; t his 
--
is illusion • .Je accept beliefs which turn out to be groundless ;this is 
error . However diff icult it may be to find a pl ace for error in object-
ive existence- - and Bradley has some troubles of his own making right 
here- - t he experience of individuals is that they err. 
But how can we tal k of error at all and what ground is there for s aying 
that one perception is true to reality and another false? Or how can 
one belief be true and another error if the contents of conscmousness 
are determined? .• e do know that some men bel ieve one t hing and some 
just the reverse . How is this if beliefs are determi ned? \Tho shall 
say or can s ay that a set of beliefs is right and another wrong? 
Here is the rock on ~hich more than one system of speculation has gone 
to pieces• The problem of error has well been called "a k i nd of touch-
stone for philosophical systems'' . All we need t o know of any system 
of thought is whether it is necessitar i an in its metaphys ics to kno · 
that it cannot stand the test of the problem of error . Thus on the 
pl ane of the determined any ground for making distinctions bet~een 
right and wrong beliefs-between truth and error vanishes . But as a 
matter of f act we kno · that all sorts of belie fs do ex ist and that fi 
some are truth others must be erreD. Can it be that error is nec es-
sotated as well as truth? It must be so and if so ~hat t hen becomes of 
the t rus t worthiness of our reason? Here ;ve reach the abysses again , 
and all grounds of distinction between t ruth and err or vanish away , and 
scepticism looms up as the only alternative . The only way out of t h is 
darkne s s is by t he way of freedom . Another and powerful reason why we 
must assume the h i gher causality o:f freedom . In the ability of the free 
conscious subject to use the faculties of reason wrongly or rightly 
and t he reby a rrive at conclusions erroneous or truthful , we find the 
valL i ty of the reason once again justif ied . Of course we are not free 
to make truth but we are free to take the sens ations which come from 
without and t he i mpulses which arise from within and exami ne them, com-
pare them , test them by standar s , and finally accept some 8 S true and 
reject others as false. But all this re quires freedom--t hat the mind 
have the power of initial activity ; there must be no eterminat ion 
except the self- determination of the reflecting , judging wi l ling agent . 
Thus it appears that freedom i s t he foundation of all that trust in our 
f aculties which is t e s ine qua non of our attempts to comprehend the 
t hought process . 
And now what effect does t h e denial of f reedom have upon our at -
tempts to comprehend t he moral life of man? What is the relation of 
Determi nism to Ethics? 
There is not much need of discussion here . f ter what has been already 
s ai d c oncerni~g the necessarily subjective element in mot i ves , and the 
impossibility of natural events i n consciousness(like sensations , impul -
ses of appet ite etc . }generating themselvesinto motives , the argument 
for the dynamic determination of the will is gone . Ethics on a con-
sistently naturalistic bas is is a slim affai r . The basal ethical ideas 
of Duty , Virtue , Obligation , Responsibili ty~~: f:Lnd no room to stand on. 
Fo~ a consistent determinism cancels responsibility. Our entire life 
moral as well as cognitivo becomes as we have s een the necessary re-
sultant of antecedent forc es in the physical system. To make our cog-
nition thus necessitated doew not appear so bad t o superficiDl thi nki ng 




openly and evidently discounted . Fortunately it is too much of an out-
rage to the commpn, moral consci eusness of men to deny freedom out:Fight . 
Automatism cancels ethics . But here the old inconsistency appears . 
Naturalistic writers have freely discussed responsibility , virtue, 
goodness etc~ : ~eemingly i gnorant of the truth that the ground- work of 
their philosophy leaves no room for all these ethical ideals - at least 
in the sense in hich they are co~only understood . If et!1ics is to be 
merely a science for the study of the physical consequence of conduct , 
and hen~3 for the developement of shrewd· and sagac ity i n avoiding pain 
and other physical evils , it may erhaps stand on its basis of natural-
istic principles. But i~ the word right is to have an essential mean-
ing , if responsibility and obligation are to be taken as real then 
ethics must postul ate at least a free om of choice among impulses and 
incitement to action,; -.nat has already been said in connection with the 
essentially subjective charact er of motives, and concerning the prob-
lem of error is sufficient to show that no theory of conducy v;hich can 
be called moral (with any decent regard to the meaning of the word 
moral) can be built upon the deterministic £¢n~datdon . 
\!e affirm again therefore that a genuine freedom must be -postulated 
f or the finite spirit before any theory of right cona.uct can be framed 
...,e have reminded ourselves i n the very beginning ho\7 philosophy is 
a concern primarly of human life and bur finite experience . Any just-
t i' ication. or freedom of d-eterminism must therefore ber, in with the facts 
of our experience. ""~oy; in the psychological treat:rpent of the facts of 
!} 
experience we have discerned a parting of the ways . The psychology of 
::-:aturalism as su.rnes that the s cient i fi c inductive method is to be app-
Jied strictly to the facts of' consciousness as to all other facts. 
In other words it is assumed that experience is phenomenal - that it 
is something to be observed and explained ::i,n{l~:JJ~nrl~nT.ly of the person 
who experiences the experience . That the facts of the mental life 
being thus phenomenal a re to be included within the all-embracing law 
of causality ~ thi"~ is the baS; : <=~J- assumption of the naturalistic philoso-
pher . On the other hand the philosophy of spiritual Idealism starts wi t 
with an entirely different assumption, viz ; that while causality may 
rule in all the realms of the unconscious, ~ret a higher pr i nciple is 
aemancled t o explain conscious exper ience, ana that the experient is the 
prime factor to be reckoned with in all attempts to explain experience. 
Theref:cre the defend.er of spiritual Iclealism den i es the assumption of 
naturalistic reterrninism that the inductive scientific method is the 
only one which can do justice to the facts of the ::sychic order. Ee 
asserts in opposition that the scientific inductive met hod is hope-
-~ \/ 
l es~.:: inadecluate to deal v.;i th the facts of consc ious experience. A few 
words in justific · tion of this . 
·r-hen cleal ing with the f acts of nature thi s Sl ecill..lator stands over 
against the f acts an observes them as it were from v, ithout. :Sut the 
facts of conscious experience cannot be thus observed. Tl1e psychologist 
can never stand over against his own states and study them as a spec-
tator . This was the elusion which lead 2ume to deny the reality of sel 
sel f consciousness altogether . And as for standing over against the 
mental states of other conscious beings whether men are anima l s, in the 
psychological l ab orat ory or out of i t - that r ema ins exceedingly da~bt-
----
ful business even to this day . The onl y tnethod :1hich has justif ied its -
elf a s a equate by not producing conse quences ('is&.s tr.n.n~ - to the reas on 
is the inwar ' the " vi t 1 n as (' i l)SOn calls it ( '")ersonal I rlealism r 1 7·'J 
The trouble with much of the present c1 a y"ex-periment a l :ppsychology" is 
right here . The s p ecula tor tries to look on from ·;vi thout and thinks he 
can know all there is to be known in this way . He observes a nd hears 
as the audience o at the Symphony conce:t't . The au ience hears the 
sounds and knows something of h ow they are produced and appreciates t11e 
harmonies of the comp osition as a vrhole; but it is left those who pro-
duce the .1usic to understand i ts innermost meaning . For they comprehend 
the si~~nals of the conductor and express his f eelings ana "'Ur oses i n 
~ -
their execut ion of the music. The im·rar or vi tal method is the only 
one which can do jus tice to the facts of the mental life . It i s not 
alone by observation and induction but by introspection a s vell, the 
results of which ·will be checked by experience and logical deduction 
there from,,that philosophy is to move on. 
···e h ave now found some weighty r easons why \'!e must postula te fr ee -
·- om a s a fun amental i mplication of the whole cognitive and mora l life 
of man. '\e follow the pathway vrhich brings us to the i e a of the human 
S'9 iri t i mmediat ely determined. and limited by necessary connection v:i th 
the physical ord.er to be sure, yet ultimately determined by n othing in 
that order but only by reason , or the very nature of the mind itself . 
,...e are pre i.. . · well clear of the eterminism implied in the material-
i s tic or aturalistic view of life. 
But there is still a iiDeterministic i mplication •;hich we have n ot fully 
f a ced . 
-- ranted that the finite s p irit is not determ~ned b 1 
.J. y any 
--
.. 
blind forces of the natural order , can we yet claim that autoDomy of 
s pirit for man y:hich the personal philoso , I~~~r · requires in or"' er to 
justif y i tself? -hat is the relation of the Infinite Spirit to 
the finite , an is that relation such as to m0 ke it impossible for 
us to think of man 's S)irit as free? "~at does freedom mean in that 
orJaaer outlook which we ain when, having found the absolute need of 
nfinite Thought as the metaphy s ica l ground of all, we endeavor to 
think out our relation to this all- groundi:P,g Inf i:2i te Thought. I'h is 
opens up the way f or such discussion~ of the philoso· hy of the Abso-
l ute as i s re . uired to r escue personality from all i mplications which 
would estray it. 
::HA-TER III 
The Absolute . hilosoph~~ - as . eveloped by Eegel ,, as an ttempt to re -
c onci le all< the diversities of f inite existence in he one -- all - embrac -
ing universal conception of the bsolute Consciousness . Its rr, ost im-
~ortant i mplication is the ~henemanality (unreality in itself) of fin-
ite experience. It se eks from a highl :r abstract po int of view an by a 
h i e hly abst r act method to effect an identif ication of all c ons ciousness 
in the one Jl. osolute Self . ~he highl y abstract point of view ;hich Eegel 
occupied as over against eoncrete life i s indicated in h is O'an '!:ords: -
'~ the '7."el t geist of our .time, !?_O busy with concrete reality, an drawn 
to··-ard the · outer, is ke-pt from turning ini".'arcl and to itself, and from 
j-
enj uyine itself in its own home " This deploring of devotion to 
-1- ~h._, rv ~J .. !J,.Jr~.,_r- (r. ~2.'(- ) ~ ~~ ~..,._ C-'-~ . 
-concrete res lity and our··outer"i. e . finite ex·Jerience , f; ives us a gl~ 
_p se of the true ch~1racter of the philosophy of the Absolute . The most 
tel l ing critic isms dlich can be passe upon it are those thic have bee'Jl 
often passed, namely, it neglects the human standpoint in ph ilosophy ; 
nor does it t ake s uf f icient a ccount of the facts of fin i te experience ; 
it becomes hopelessly i nvolved in abstractions an continuall mistakes 
lot; ic s l f or ont olog ical exis t ence; it fa ~·ls a lso to t· .ke account of the 
·-v ~:. li U.ons l element in human life. That Absolutism cancels t he in e -
pend~nce of the finite self and consequently precludes personality is 
our main concern . ': e shall have to deal Jith . bsolutism suf ficiently to 
show the t horouf;h - g ;ing dete r minism implied in its octrine of the self 
and its 7eakness an ina equa cy ·r;hen taken in rela tion ?i th all the 
higher interests of human life. For it makes little difference heth-
er the finite spirit be t how;ht of as determined by the blind non- in-
telligent forces of nature , or by some all-embracing Absolute Conscio-
usness - the eterminism is all the same . And our present concer n is to 
rescue the postulat ~ .of · :'fr..e-ecl ~ • :: :, : -.·r:. from all i mplications v7hich 
woula. destroy it , and so pave t he way for our exposition of ~ersonal :i:sm 
An d so ce r tain are we of the necessity of t i s p ost~late of freedom as 
the basis of tha t phil osophy wh ich is t o do 'Nhat a ll philosophy must do 
namel y, help us to a r ?. ti ::mal comprehensj_on of the ~·orld an our ex-
istence in i t so certa in are we of free om that we are bol d to c on-
dem as i nadequate any system which makes no ~rovision for f reedom . 
'""e have made t; ooc this condemnation in the case of ::. aturalism· 
' 
e pro-
pose now to make it g ood in the case of Absolutism. 
: f~ YH~fiy 
:'he Absolutmst is a more ins ic}. i rn1 ~ ," to our pe rsonal pllilosophy than 
.. , 
than the ::a.turalist f or the re ason that the _· ersonalist a nd the bs o-
lutist agree ent i re l y on the rea t broad t ruth of the p r i macy of mi nd 
and the denial of i n:'1 ep en tant r e Bl ity to a l l forms of materi a l exist-
ence . ~hen therefore the Ab sol utist be l abors Naturalism we a re one ith 
him . -·hen he exponds things as only phenomenal a nd s pace and time as 
mere li::ni t i n[, forms of finite existence, an the" thi ng i n itself" a s 
an unc r itical mys t ery , and nature as a unity an orge.n ic too Infinite 
Thought , the Personalist c an respon. _, Amen . But when re li ty is affirmed 
only of universals an de n ie to .art icule rs, ,.,.hen 1 the diver sities 
ano i nharmonies are SElia. to be re conc iled an unified i n the one - all-
emb r a cing Consciousness wh ich is efined a s the "7:hole of "'xperience :· 
e.nrr especially v-,:hen the f inite self i s inclu e d a lone 11'.'1 th all other 
phe nomenal appearances7·: the Personalist finds it high time to enter h i s 
cavea t a n be -i n the attack with the ;eanonz of critieis m. 
-Absolut i,.. r;~ is the g eneral term we shall B" i v · t o t he hilos ophy- of 
the bsolute of the writers ·-;h ose works have been i n c lu ed within our 
course, ::ra cl ley and Green ·( ? roleglmlena t o 'Sth ics) a re the princ ill91 
sources of my kno?,ledge of r~hat Absol ""J..tism tea ches. 
::r 3 ra cl. ley in h i s Ap-·e a r nnce an Real i ty" has g iven an exposition o f 
Fcecl i an met a . hysics. I :pre s ume i t is typical, "' ince :rr . ·:r aCl l e seer.' s 
to be one of the most ·prominent Regelians in England an the Ox forC1 
Epsay ists replt to h i m ~uite fre quently . Mr . J r adley · evotes the first 
t~elve cJ1apters of h i s b ook to an at tempt t o sho i tha t our cognitive ex-
:perience c ~ n g ive only " a p _. earancen. In the 1 st f ift een chRpters he 
sets f orth t he compe l l inG necessity of transcen inr, a ll th i s mere phen-
ooe nali sm and f i naing reality in the Absolute . Some of t h e . iscussionr 
is go od, but it i s h is t reatement of the finite s elf, t he m8king that 
self a mere fihase of the Absolute that erently concerns us. 
In the chaTlter on '' Things 11 .Eradley presents the tt«WJ.r:b.radiction ... in-
vel ved in the i ea of an inde-:J enq .fmt l y exist inc; thing ,_rrhich mus t be tho 
thought to rema in ide ~t ical with itsel f through series of _hysical ch-
anges. ~ oming to the " Self" he g ives the same trea t ment exactly and con 
eludes that 1ike the 11 thing 11 the self is a"mere ap "1 earance" - something 
which i s e iven, an in a sense, most certainl y exists, but . h ich·· ·is too 
full of contradictions to be a g enuehne fact . I have been forced to em-
brac e this conclusion". ( 2n e it jon p 751 
In discuss ing the 11 reality of the Self" he gets into 1:1 veritable uag-
mire of confus i on and an t i nomy '' oes the self affor a me ans" he asks, 
" whereby the metaphys ical r>uzzle of iversity an unity r1ay be solved . 
~oes it g ive us aid an comfort in the nc~~ ence of t he problem of i~ en­
tity vs change? Alas no . " The self" cannot efend its own ree.lity i rom 
the .. O\ver of morta l objection". ~hen tested by r:r. J ra ley ' s standard 
of real ity, the se l f disap,:P~ R.t' R again· and aes.in like a mirage . 
Regard it a s i e will - as feeline. or as c. form of self consciousness , 
or as consciousness of ~ersonal i entity, a~ as will, or as inoependant 
re a~ ity (monad ) , the same di smal resul t fo l l ows. 
Swar ms of antinomies anc1 cont r . _icti ons come in and destroy the rea lity 
of the self, in the opinion of ~~r . :?radley. Feelings i mpl y relat-
ion , s o a oes self cons ciousness . Indeed Mr . Brad ley ' s failure t o find 
that self eonsciousness is free from thes o : t , rrihle r elati onsfwhich 
limit and therefore destroy the reality of everything) , and his G ~cis ­
ion that he cannot understan d self consciousness, and -h is confession 
that h e "Scarcel y kno~s h ow to argue this ~o int" p . 1 0 9 i . ~· the 
point of volition a s a fac t te stifying t o the existence of the self, -
all this is very ~athetic . Of course all atternps to sh ore up the t otter 
ing self by appeals to the consciousness of ersonal i dent ity g o the 
same way as self consciousness for this propo sed consciousness of i den-
tity i nvolves unity amid diversity - an i nsol uble puzzle f or i mpers on-
a l me taphys ics. He s ays (p . ll2) that i n his ju gment, it is superfluous 
to eo any furthe r .in showing the unreality of the sel f . But still he 
does go on . He"ventures a few words on t hat embarassint; t o ~ ic (p .ll4 } 
the will' "Here" says our au t hor, n is a promi se of t he sol ut ion of our 
met a --hys ical !_)Uzzle", for ve seem at l B.st to f i nd something l ike a self 
.~ontained c use" 
;;~ -
~~ere is a faint glimmer of light but he rompt -
ly proceeds to ext ineui sh it. Ref err ing t o his tre s..tement of" a ctivity " 
(which sub ject iscusse ' ith no reference to an actor oid turn out to 
be pretty dark) and h is discuss ion a lso of causality/ v:i th the obscur-
ity of vhich VIe are f airly f amiliar) e procee d to show that volition 
involves all the same oJd dreadful difficul tiess of change v. ith ident -
ity and unity V'.' ith plurality. He must understand vol ~t ion an free · it 
fr om a l l q,ni; in:bor:\ H.: :ro or he wi ll be obliged t o pronounce it '' mere app -
ea r a.nce". He is moved to indignation an d t o s~~a~m t the hint that 
after all the fl Uesti on hov• "e will (like t hat of hO"J we t hink) may be 
a bit of a mystery and may h ave to r ema in so • . he teachinc oj tLe in-
. epena~nce of the consc ious self (as in Leibni tz 's ~onaa ol og ie) he 
cli sposes of ·wit h the ob j ect ion t hat when once the ind i vidual sel f is 
admitted to exist "in r elations " i ts i ndependence is gone( . 117) . 
Of c ourse this i s not so except when relat ion i s i;-t :f:tde r st ood as , 
a ll deterrnininr, conc1ition . The monad doctrirre a·aes inceea_ g o to piec es 
(on the p:robl em of er:cor for i nstance) bu t i t d.oes not shat ter in t'1e 
vmy ~:r . radl ey thin_rs it do es; ana furthe:r Jore it po i nts to a path,~;ay 
y,·hich leads much nearer to a comprehension of our finite experienc e 
than '...bsolutlis:n. does . 
nere nov is the source of all rr . Brafl y ' s troubles?· h a t is the 
matter? The matter ·is that he has set up a false s tandard of reality 
wh ich permits n othi n5 partia l or relate to be r ea l. If - Te take real 
a s meaning compl ete i n it se l f - then it is very evi ent that n othing can 
be real but the sum total of existence the All of experience . This 
standard i s based simply on what c an be knov;n-i t takes no a c e ount of 
human sensibility. ~atuTally rheh he tests h e se l f by t is __ i nd of a 
st andard of reality it dissolves away very promptly . Bu t that tl1is 
standard of reality is so abstract as to be untrue ve nee hard l y point 
out . His mn or s c press the ab s tractness of his stan ar • e s'·ys , 
(p . I20)" :J or metaphysics a princ iple i f it i s to . stand t a ll , mu st 
stand abs olutel~ b;z itself --'1.1! I but the se l f is so f r f'r m SUfl lying ,, tl"J, 
such a :principle that it seems , \':here n ot hiding itself in obscuri t;y- , 
a mere bundle of discrepancies . Our search has brought us again n ot to 
reality but to mere a.ppear nee 1' f course the finite self , wi~l 
sho ... ;; u p as 1'mere appearanc e"when the basal princ iple of reality is t hus 
c onceived as necesssrily "standing abeolutel~,r by itself': \. 1 1 finite 
existences exist in relations ; their very l i mitat ions are the mark of 
their finiteness . ~ e object most emphatically to this w· y of efin i ng 
metaphysical reality , and a.ffirm that n o one has any right so to efi ne 
it . It i gnores bas a l elements. 
Furthermore . i n his treatment of the finite self I'~r . radley fall s 
into the s ame fal lacy which obscur·es t he visi .Jnof all deniers of the 
self . He a ssumes that the self cf:m be known in its essential reality 
just ns a thing can be. A thing is an object of knowledge and as such 
its nature is summed up in what can be known of it-its :percipi . But 
-- i,7hile a self is indeec~ an object of knowledge to otheT no\'"ring subjects 
who perceive i t, its nature as a selfis more than this. It is in the very 
nature of a self not only to be kn0\711 but to be conscious of its otnvn 
existence as separate fromall other existences. The reality of a self 
therefore is not the same as the reality of a thing. Testing the real-
i ty of the self by the same standard as V.'e apply to a thing ana. the 
self like the thing fails to justify its realityand dissolves off into 
a mere a: pearanee. But \"Then we see the fallacy of an abstract standard 
of reality which tacitly demands metawysical completeness , and the 
f urther fallacy of testing the reality of the self by the s sme processes 
a. s we do the reality of the me re thing , or object of knowledge , then -vie 
beg in to see that 3rad.ley's ruling t he finite self out of the realm of 
reality is a coltossal piece of assumption. ~e must be clear here for 
the point is so vital. Bradley in summine; up the case against the re al-
i ty of the self gives as the general reason "we have founcl so far, that 
diversity and unitycannot be reconcileCi"(p . IIS) Of course they cannot, 
exg eJ)t by assuming the valiclity of the basal i mplications of all exper-
ience,namely that the self is a conscious unifie"' existence- that the 
di-gersity of finite experience is unified and correlated. in the unity 
of the finite self . To justify the self by logical a.emonstra tion is i m-
possible and to attempt it would be absurd. Mr . Bradley ought to know 
this and he would know it if he haC!. not cast off all finite moo r i nes 
---... 
r hen he set h i mself adrift on the sea of the Absolute philosophy . 
lie would also see that all philosophiz i ng re ui res some mundane begin-
nings. Even if one proposes shortly to leap into the air , a firm stand 
on the earth is necessa ry ns a beginnihg . Some truths have to be t a.en 
for grante at the stfart . Some postulates must be accepted ; some facts 
f rom our experience be allowed as facts. Mr . Bradley will never be 
s a.veo. fr om all his dreadful antinomies and f rom the 11Ultimate :Doubts"in 
the last chapter until he begins t o learn something about personality 
as a fact of experience and its meani ng for metaphysics . 
IJet us see now whether •bsolut i sm will show its strength or its 
weakness in clealins ·with the probl em of error . Bradley confesses ( I86) 
that 11 er ro r is without question a dangerous subject ~ It cer tai nly is 
as his wrestling with it proves . It has floored many another speculator 
before flooring I!i.r . Bradley . He sets forth the di l emma bravely ,-a dil-
l ernma v:rhich would not exmst but for the fact that the doctrine of the 
Absol ute :f:'inas no place for the free f inite spirit . 11 Everyth ing" he 
. 
says,"must be either reality or non-existent ~ p , I26) ; error obstinately 
refuses to be either ; Y/e cannot declare it to be non-c~::istent ; nor can 
we say it is real . f or if real it is included 1·.-ithin the Absolute ; and 
cannot properly belong to t te finite subject because hat . ith all its 
contents is alsm included within the Absolute . So error has no place or 
r i ght to exi st ;yet for all that it a.oes ex ist ! here sure l y is trouble 
f or the Absolutist. Bra dleys method of exit from thi~ self -imp osed 
cilemma is very lame . It is essentially this: Errors are partial t ruths 
and result from a misplac i ng of the predicates a s over agai ns t such c on 
junction of subject and predi cate ns is cl.emanded by reality . This being 
its nature error can be corrected and become truth . How , \'re do not know 
but all contra iction will dissapear in rearrangement and in the larger 
and higher experience of t he Absolute where all is complete and hal~mon­
i ous. The only real assurance of all this is that Nr . J3radley tells us 
it is so" on't object to it "he s ays"for this vie\V of a harmony is pos-
sible and that is all we want!"(see chapter on "Error") 
Now this way of ealing with error is a failure because (I)it i s n ot 
true to our experience . -r:J e know· perfectly well that ¥ff¢f ~J/4 ei:il af-
fords the same k ind of troubletto Absolutmsm tha t error oes. And evil 
and error are both facts of experience. r::by does Era ley affirm that 
they are not rea1. , but are"partial truths " and 11 incomplete good"? 
Simply becayse he is compelle to do eo by the demandw of his theory. 
We have no other ground than his assurance that it must be so because 
theAbsolute must be a harmonious system , (p.I96) Eut our reply is that 
our experience is not thus adequately dealt with . To say that error is 
"part ial truth" is to i nvolve thought in confus ion , and to neglect the 
moral consciousness of men . Tested by the practical results in action 
which follow from error '/e shoulC: say that"partial" or "incmnplete r~ 
truths are about as difficult to include es real wiyhir. the perfection 
of the Absolute a s though we affi rmed error and evilto be real in ex -
perience. . e shall briefly indicate the constructive answer to this 
shabby treatmentof a critical sub ject reservi ng further treatment of 
error fo r our positive EXposition of personalism. rye deny Bradl ey 's 
a ssertion that everything must be e ither metaphysically real or else 
non-existent. This may be so on his plane of the impersonal . But admit-
tjng the free fin i te spirit, we can have "indetreminate" thought or an 
interrogative s tate of mind . ·w.e shall return to this later. Error ex-
ists but it exists in finite thought when judgment has been madeby a 
finite spirit , acting freely, which judgment is subsequently seen to be 
out of harmi ny with the facts of reality 
Infurther criticism ~e charge the Absolutist with neglecting the bas 
al postulate t~at philosophy is an a f f air of our life . In support of 
this charge we call attention to t he discussion of Ti e(on . 2I5) 
"For let us suppose,first that t here are beings v: ho can come in contact 
in no .ay with t hat worl which ·e exper ience . ~ ~ fl nd let us suppose , 
next , tha t in the Absolute the direction of these lives runs opposite to 
our own . i. 7tffDeath would come before birth, the blo ould f'ollo the 
wound and all must seem to be irrational . It woul- seem to me so , but its 
inconsistency would not exist except for my partial experience · ~~~~'r·:~Or , if 
I could see it from a point of view beyond the limits of my life , I 
might find a r eality which itself hacl , a s such , no direction." 
This sort of reasoning appears in other places notably ( p . 53E·) "The 
1·1orld t hat we can observe , is certainly not all the uni verse ; an we do 
not know how much there may be which we cannot observe . And hence every 
where an indefi nite supplement from the unknown is possible . Now mi ght 
there not be conditions , invisible to us ,which throught our experience 
mo ify the action of pleasure and pain? In thi s way what seems to be 
essential to ·pain may actual ly not be so." 
The weakness of this is apparent . He might as Vlell say t ~at in t he 
Absolute our blue is red ·etc . or as Mill did that .he could conceive a 
world where 2and 2 make 5. Could he ! Of' course we know absolutely 
becov:.lse 
nothing of such a world ana to suppose it simply/\there is nothing 
which logically f orbids , is to f ly off into the realm of the abstract. 
We need to be held down to earth . ~e are philosophizing ab out our world 
of experience . The "indefinite supplements from the unknown" are 
quit e gratuitous . They are not properly the subject for philosophy . 
~hen we start in to tell "hat we might know if we had more or different 
faculties , or lived in a different world, there is no end to the things 
we could suppose as possible . ~ charge him ·ith us i ng the 
word experience with no reference to a finite experient. gain and again 
-..-;e meet the words n the bsolute is experience " ( p . 2I4) etc. · .• hen thus 
employe the word i s spelled \ ith a capitalE but the question presses 
itself, whose is this experience? hen the passage is made from exper 
iences of f inite subjects to Experience which is the A solute, the 
specul ator i s guilty of an illegitimate prmcess of logical (or illogica 
abstraction . Let him either answer whose is the experience \'\'hich is 
the Absolute? or rhat is experience without an experient . And this 
suggests a general criticism of the logical method. of Absolut ism. 
In the abs olute hilosophy all is subordinated. to dialectical consid-
erations . Hegel did not fee l called upon like Kant to reckon with the 
moral side of our life, when pure reason had netted such meagre results 
I 
-;-- - Hege l sought to deduce all from thought • Now that all th i ngs are 1 
grounded in th?ught no idealist denies . The metaphysical reality of 
the world. must be so grounded , and the Infinite Thinker must be con-
ceived as wholly und.etermined by the objects of his thought. Our fre e-
dom is at best relatiue or partiali ~e are co~ditioned in our human 
consciousness by what is not ourselves . Inco~structing our tllought-
world we are conditioned by a world of objects not of our own maki ng . 
4-D 
But while thus limi tea. by a world of reality not of our maki ng • the 
world of ~ objects has no other existence but in our thought. 
And Theism teachesthat the world of our objects by which we are con-
ditioned is grounded in the thought of an Inf i nite Thinker , ho is not 
-.., conditioned thereby . but of whose thoughts and will the world is a con-
tinual expression . In other words that the world of objective(f'or us) 
i&ll 
reality exists in the Infinite thought just as the world of our know-
"" 
ledge of it exists in our finite thought . 
But in contrast rith this Abwolutism identifies the human and the 
divine consciousness in the abstract idea of"Thought''or"Universal Con-
sciousness" Its method is highly abstract and its results correspond-
i ngly valueless for l i fe . The Absolutists o not s peak of the "Divine 
se lf-c on s c iou~ne :::: s nor of the human self-consciousness but of Self- Con-
sciousness in general i.e . the Universal Consciousness which is the 
only true Self. Spirit is used in the same way ,-not Divine spirit 
nor hu..rnan spirit but "Spirit". But "Spirit"is a pure abstraction; only 
spirits or intelligences are real . Thus too all distinction be-
t ween divine and human fades a~ay . The finite has no metaphysical ex-
istence being only a"mode"or"phase"or"appearance"or"orga.n"of the 
Infinite Here we come to the full fruit of the Hegelian abstraction,-
the denial of the real ity of the finite self, by its being merged in 
the unity of the Absolute. In our positive exposition of the meaning 
of selfhood we shall more fully sho · the f allacy of this . Suffice it 
to s ay here that the identification is a merely verbal one and involves 
that logical fallacy so often met in philosophy - the mistaking a# ¢~i¢-
logical f orm for an ontological reality. This is why the student who 
rea s Gre en 's Prolegomena and Bradley is sorely puzzled at first and 
wonders why he cannot grasp . These writers employ the conc ept ion of the 
Absolute a s includine both Infinite and Finite and sometimes 11 the 
Absolute " does u y for one and sometimes for the other. ] o wonder the 
student who is accustomed to the or inary limitations of logic f eels 
somewgat abashed in the presence of such august disregard of ialectic 
consistency. 
_he,, or '' ex""erie:hce 11 is used in the same confusing ay . e can i n-
/ 
deed understan experience (small e) as summing the contents of finite 
consciousness; an Experience (large E) as summing the contents of 
Infinite consciousness and hence corresponding to the 11 of reality . 
But when finite consciousness i s declare to be" mere app~nnance" and 
not reality then experience se ems to be no more . But 7hat Zxpe rience 
can mean as related to our life of which philosophy i s supposed to be 
a rational inter.retation , becomes very dark . 
he method of the Absolutists is abstraction itself. tarting from 
the idea of pure Being the attempt is made to account for the world by 
logical synthes is. But i s this eetting clear of our fin~te experience. 
Certainl y not . The baldest, barest abstraction llth which thought can 
begin is abstracted from experience. Absolutism cannot clear itself of 
a certain empirical element which must exist i n all finite kno ledge. 
Its method reminds us of the me thod of the evolutionary decucer of li fe 
organisms . He goes b ~·- c k to some beggarly oeginnings like protoplasm or 
ooze or star ust- (or anythin~ you please so long as it can begin to 
mJve upward ). Then g ive h im the unive rse for room and a f ew million 
years for time and he will evolve things a s they are - a synthesis, 
·"-
marvelous indeed~ In his log ical method the Absolutist is not much bet-
ter. He will begin vvith nothi ng but the baJ:e·s.t Being . No assumptions 
of the reality of finite self- consciousness; no categories taken for 
granted; - just ~ure Being. But whence this idea of Be ing - from our 
f inite experience of course. It can come from no other scource than from 
the fulness and content of our ac t1~al ex-perience by a process of log-
ica l abstraction . And does BeinG produce of itself the less vague con-
ceptions which foll ow in this Hegelian synthesis ? Impossible. The log-
ical advance depends upon our experience r i ght along. But this exceed-
i ngl y abstract method which cannot clear itself of human experience for 
its beginnings or its progress/ manages to disregard the human sufficieE 
tly to r revent it from leading to any results of much account in enab-
ling us to understand the world of our finite experience . And here is 
the weakness of Absolutism. And we repeat that it is not ane~uate to 
the facts of finite life . It ends in the mists and clouds, because it 
leaves the earth almost as sson as it begins . 
The P+actical Outcome of Absolutism. 
Bradley ad.l!lits (paBe 501) that philosophy has to reckon \=': i th and just-
ify the various si es of our life. " But this is imp o,::, siblen he ad s, 
''if any side is made Absolute" And consequently our author fee ls called 
upon to declare pleasure and pain, feeling, perception, volution and 
the aesthetic attitude all mere ap _earance . Because no one of these s ide c 
of life can be taken as the whole of experience . therefore each is pro-
nounced unreal! This suggests again the arbitrary an unjust ifiable 
standard of reality set up by Absolutism. Any suggestion that cognition 
or volition are primal facts of experience and are to be received as 
r eal i s met v; ith vigorous denial and the ol d objec tion i s hurried forth 
that they are n ot i nde pendent and therefore are mere ap ·earance and 
not real .The suppo sed pri macy of the will comes i n for dogmat ic denial 
and a s yec i a l anathema of s arc a sm is renounce on this "muddy r efuge 
of the troubled i n philosop_y~ Of course if ~e ~rant the Abs olutist s 
standa rd of reality an allo ; hi s log ical method, we shall have to g o 
with him t o the end . But we have al ready g iven reasons for re jecting 
the standar of real ity and pointed out the fatal e fects in the met-
hod . 
In Siite of the Absolutists protests that ~ractical p1 inc i ples and 
ends are not to be t aken into ac count and that philosophy must be theo-
retical ( B . p . 48L1 ) we propose to ask what is the pract ical outcome o:f 
Absolutism . ~;e shall find that the net result is not r~mch different f rom 
that of ~aturalism. If it be a mi tted that phi l osophy is an affair of 
finite thought and lif~, then i t i"! i ll have to be admi tte d that like 
Natural ism , Absol uti sm s tands discounted by virtue of its very outcome,-
that it i s i na e quate an defe ct i ve as a. gu i de to the un erstanding of 
our rational exper ience. 
In the last t u o chapters the exposition of ~r . Bradley contains some 
items of inf ormat i on about the Absolute, but a go o of i gnorance too, 
and withal~- . ~orne ttul timate oubts". To the question ·,·hat i s the relat-
ton between the f i n i te suo ect an d the Absolute, the only answer forth-
c oming is, "we o not know~!/ -!! be yon us" . ,_ uf:f ice it to say that the 
Absolute or Experience i s one and the many fin i t e subjects are centers 
of experienc e (small e) a,r feel ing. ~hy and :-:o :? - ·~e do not know. 
To the quest i on, is the Absolute personal ? the answer is vague and 
con fusing . No where does ::r . 2.J raclloy rc; i ve evi r ence tha t he knows "<Vhat 
personality means (in the thought of many of his idealistic Oj'1'"· onents 
at least), i. e. a be ing se lf-c onsciousness and self-determining. 
Infin · te ,...,ers ona lity means a being ...,erfectly conscious. of sel f an . 
therefore perfectl y conscdlous of the non-self' or universe, an r erfect -
l y self- etermined . Fi n i te ~ersonality means a being relat ively conscious 
of self and part ially self- etermining. If he did understand. personality 
in this -..ray , he would reply very rromptly inste d of after !!luch quali~y-
ing, }o the Absolute is i mpersonal. Fe seems to t l. ink personality is a 
mark of finite limitation. In the sense i n which personality is under-
st ood above Absolutism knov s nothing of it. ~ t this po · n , the "ersonal 
phi losophy and the r i g id impersonality of .bsolutism come out. into the 
sharpest antithesis . 
As to 'practical T!'l oral ends, 'lrao.ley assures us that metaphysie s has 
nothing to o with them. The Im~ortality of the finite spirit is l eft 
with out ogmatic denial , but there is no asm.trance. .he best that b-
solutism can s ay :"..: personal continuance is possible , an it is but lit-
tle more. till , if any one can believe in it, and finds himself sus-
ta ined by that belief, - after all it is · rpossible. On the other hand 
it i s bet 1· er to be qui t of both hope and fear, than to l a, se back into 
any form of degrading superstipionn . 
After this, i t is useless to inquire \· hether t e bsolute is 
~ oral; it i s not (p . 53S): : nor can happ iness be predicated of the Absol-
ute (p . 534). Finite knowledge is entirel y relative (p . ~ 44 ); and it is 
all err or to 0 in the se ~se that it can never reach reality~p. 549 ) . 
The Absolute turns out in the end to be absolutely inscrutable . 
·~ 
~ut our criticism of Absolutism ar e done. If the ~ r ords "by their 
fru its ye shall knor1 them" app l y to philos o!:)hic systems , then enough has 
come forth to enable us to - ercieve the defects and \'leaknesses of Ab-
s olutism . Lisregarding mumnn life, and its dearest interests, it is 
only to be expected t1at the outcome of bsolutism shoul be of little 
val ue . Of what v,rorth t he homilies on the infirmities of our finite 
reason? ~here the inspiration in the thought of a determinism by sane 
au[';us t Abs olute i ealist ic a.eterminism is as eadening to spontan-
eous moral endeavor as is naturalistic determinism. T~ere is the moral 
and religous value of postul at ing an inf inite mind 'hich cannot be 
thout;ht of as possessing a single moral attribute? 
As over against naturalistic determinism on t he one hand and the 
Ab solutists ceni al of the finite self on the other , we propose the 
phi lo sotJhY of .. ersonality, not as a solution of all problems an a dis-
sitJation of all myster~es , but as throwing light on some of the deeper 
difficulties of metaphys ics :rhich, on the i mpersonal plane a re impen-
etrable; and as keep ing so close to human life and finite experience 
that ~ hilo s ophy remains vhat it ought to be - a gu ide to the rational 
comprehension of the v. hole of our finite experience and kife . 
--
CT:A_ TER IV . 
_:£~ SO !:.L I TY THE U mrHATE L _HIIO SOPHY . 
"":'hat is the meaning of _ersonality for plil.tlosophic thought? This is 
our first auestion. _ersonality is a word often use d and often abus ed . 
Of course we dis:niss all thour hts of bo ily form be i ng essential a s cru "' 
and uncritical. : e assert, i n the f irst place, that -personality means 
c onscious existence. 3ut understanding conscious as ab ility to fee l , 
and t h is ap~lies to all living creatures. Conscious must therefore mean 
not only sensibil ity , but co[;nition, - a thinking not simpl y a fee l ing 
intelligence . 3ut here we have not yet transc enoed t he brute creation . 
-:-hy i s a man a person and a og not a person. The dist i nctive thing is 
selfhood . The dog has i n ivi uality, that is to say he has a certain 
set of habi ts 1 pecularities -an d traits which make h i m the part icul ar 
dog tha t he is . All dogs are much alike in their habits , ins tincts, etc . 
~·e s ay it is their canine or dog nature . nut in additi on to their dog 
nature, there is also their individuality which c an be recognized on 
acquaintance with a particular dog . But when we come to t he man e find 
something more. The man to o has his trait s ann habits common to all men-
his human nature . He has also t he set of t raits Dnd hab i ts , physical 
and mental - the makeup , as -vve s ay - which make s him the part icula r ms n 
that he is . Thi s is his indivi duality. But in addition there is some -
thing the man has •h ich e have no go od reason to believe the ani mals 
have . It is a rational c onsciousness, not only of the world of objects 
about h i m, but ~f himsel f as a -pa rticular existence apart from all 
other objects of his consciousness, both things and other c onscious 
selves . Thi s is uni ~ue and undeducible . 
Thus far, the factors essent i F..l to pe rsonr1 li ty a re fairly in .is.c'ut-
able. '~e n ow add the final element, of self- "etermination . A person mus t 
not be a machine or an automat om , but must be capable of initiating 
movements both f. hysical an mental v i thout depending u .. on fo Lces exter-
nal to the self. Our exposition of the outcome of a ll deterministic 
phisolo}lhy in the preceeding discussions, 1ill justify the assertion 
Qf this final element in personality. ~e as ~ ert it, as we shall probab-
l y say aga in, not because we can demonstrate it but becau_se e,n~;rthing 
short of freedom for the finite s -pirit closes up the way to knovvlea.ge 
and morality . Freedom, there fore, is a fund.amental postulate . It is 
demanded by the highest interests of out life. These hig~est inter-
ests , - the trust orthiness of our reason, the r ation c omprehension of 
our moral lit·e and our religd10us f a ith, are of such transcen t~ent value 
\ 
that we bo ldly a.f i irm that no philosophy can survive or is fit to which 
does not conserve them • . : e affirm freedom therefore a s the distinctive 
and essential element in personality . Personal ity then means self-
knowledg e an self-determination. But this is not yet clear~ 
f or we h ave flefined personality in terms of11 self'; The self is a con-
ception v..rhich needs a little further expo sition . -::e, t ierefore, take 
up a consid~ Eation of 
'l'he ::tQ§,ninc and . R.eality of the . Finite Self . 
A meta physics of t h e self must be a ppro&.ched a long the way of ·e .iste-
mology. Let us briefly recall fundamental truths fr om theory of }mow-
l edge . The objective basis of experien_ce is a series of successive sen-
sations. As objectively exist ent they are simply sensations which fol -
low one after the other i n time each comple te and past before the next 
c omes , ana so on . ~;e saw that the consci ous subject sta.nds over against 
...,.__ 
thi s succes s i on and by its free activity in regocn i zing an l j u ging , 
transforms a mere sucession of sensations i nt o a consci ousness of suc c-
essions . 7le saw also that the very existence of al cohe:rent experience 
de_9ends upon t h i s sy-ntheti c activity of the conscious subject . 
Thu s lmo r l edge i n i ts very structure invml ves the t-oo fornwl elements 
of conscious subject and object . Object with out sub ject :ould be gr ound -
less and forever unkno'\'m - hence non- existent for our experience. Sub-
j ect v7ithout object \":Oul d. be meaningl ess; f or the a ct ive s;y"'Tithet ic ju -
- 1Y-'I ~F~~d 
gmerit ·- · · - · · ~ - ~ on sensations is the very essence of the subject and \?i thout 
these sensat ions (objects) the sub j ect could have noth i ng t o ~ ut t oget -
her hence no existence as subject . Of course ': e are speakinr, now of 
finite experience. Now a spontaneuus active subject conscious of its 
own rel at ing and s;y-rnthetic a c t ivity as over against o'b jects, is ·:hat we 
mean by a se l f . Thi s is all that an analys is of our knowl e dge t ells us 
about the nature of the self ~ 
Noy-:; f rom 'Nhat has just been said, i t i s evident that neither subject 
nor object have meaning except wi thin the realm of our experience. 
Ne i ther can be taken by itself without losing its meaning . Th is we ha~e 
seen i llustrated in Xant 's "thing i n itself". \ihen an attempt is thus 
made to take the object apart from the subject, the r eality of t h e ob-
ject disappears ·i n f_;roundless mystery. n d to attempt to take t he sub-
j ect as an existence-in- itself i s no bet~ er. Thi s l atter i s what Abs ol-
uti sm has tried to do. Unders tanclins s elf i n the sense of consci ous sub-
ject of f i n ite experience , ! ~r . Bradley has shown t he choice asort rnent 
of perplexities and cont radictions which i merge when the sel f i s also 
taken a s a metaphys ical re ality 11 i n i tself" i. e. supposed to exist 
i ndependent l y of its ob jects of t hought • . 
Of cours e , its real i ty vanished . 
J!Tov1 the question is can v;e find our way from Epi ster:~ology over into 
the doma in of ::etaphysics an cl take the self along? I s there a metaphy-
sically existent ''self" ? ~here shRll we ground the self? 
Here we turn to Br a dley and GreeL . I n h is criticis~ of ~ume and his 
routing of Empfricism ij-reen:-ma:de tdghty use of the s elf. ·:hat account 
oes he g ive of' it? Turning to his ~'LEetaphyeics of Knowle dge 11 
(in the ;'rolegomena) we f ind that he follows Ysnt in his analysis of 
knowledge, a~cepting ~ant 's doctrine that it is only the "singl e active 
self-conscious -principle, by :vhat ever name called, which is sufficient 
to rela te phenomen to each other in a single intellig i ble universe of 
thought ( ? roleg . p . 45 ) But now, says Green , ~~ant woulc1 ho ld. us back 
fr om pressine on to an un erstandin5 of the real world. But reen will 
n ot be held back . lie will push on from Kant's theory of knowledge to a 
metaphysics of knowledge - on a1)s olut e l'hilosophy . He does this by 
exalting the "sin0 le Bctive conscious princ iple of (our) kn owle clge 11 t o 
the dignity of universal consciousness . He calls it the n s piritual 
princi "' le in nature" and the 11 eternally complete consciousness 11 • 
L<J nt in eed had abstracted the Eg o in what he called the 11 trans cenotal 
eg o'' . But in this , he was a s he freely conf essed, ealing in log ical 
£rocesses. He n o here mace any cl aims for the metaphysical existence of 
h is transcendental ego - he \1\·as a.ealing as !. e pl a inly s a;ys " not wi th 
any individual mind or consciousness , but with consci ousness in general, 
with the con a i tions of -_.ossi ble experience" . ~ut the Abso lutis~-
are not so log ically rigorous as was Yarit . They do not scrupl e to take 
the idea of"universa l c onsc i ousness" or 11 pure eg o'' (in Zant 's phrase, -
-a mere abstraction-- and boldly transform it i nto an onto log ica l exist-
ence ! ·.'!e c annot follow here ,-- there must be some other way i nto the 
t he 
domai n of the r eal except by way of unlawful abstractm on invol ve d i n 
this erection of a conception abstract ed f r om fin i te exper ience into an 
independent self- existent reality ,which transcends finite experience 
a ltogether. 
Going back now to s eek angther vray for the self i nto the domain of 
the real , we repeat that all our anal ysis of human kno-·rl ectge can tel l 
us about t he self is that it is the spontaneously active subject , con-
s cious of i ts own relating and synthetic act ivity as over against the 
objects of experi ence . But we must remember that 1hile the self 
is an ob ject to itself, it is an object to other selve s an other 
s elves are objects to it . There is therefore a universal el ement i n the 
s elf •.. hat is thi s ? ·~: e agree with the Absolutist that the human self 
cannot be t hought of as an i ndepend.ently existent real; the exi stence 
of t! e se l f ontologically must be grounde in somethi ng more than its 
i ndividual t.!.uali ties and pov;ers. As an object t o mys el f I recognize 
myself as a :Universal i.e. my exi stence corresponds to the existence of 
countless other se l ves. Ontologically I am a mere i ndividual self; but 
in my thought of myself and other's thought of me I am a universal s elf 
Now t h is l atter o~ logical existence of the self would be nonsense if 
the self were a thing . But the s el f is uni que in that its very exist-
ence is summed u p i n its o ~n 1mowledge of i ts own c onscious states , 
In de aling with our own selves therefore we can never be simpl y s pec -
tators of our own consciousness , for in attempt ing to mak e our own con-
scious sta tes object we can never cease to be sub ject. Al l se l ves 
exh ibit what we may call t he universa l ele_ment in selfhoo d . 
This is rationality , -the unm t;,'t of selfbooa inall thinkir..g and willing 
existences . ut while 'Te recodni z e this universa l element , ~: e do n ot go 
on (with the Absolutist) to affirm that this universal eleme.nt in a_ 1 
fin ite selves is the One Universal Self.-the only real existence; and 
that the finite selves (wh ose existence we admit cannot be summed u p i n 
the merely individualistic) are therefore p 1enomena of the Absolute 
Basal Real ity , - the only true Self. The reasons v:e have given . 
Theism points to a better way . The truth that Theism is the only 
viev(:which per:rli ts a solution of the probleni of knowledge has come out 
clearly in our course of stu y . The persistent dualism in our thought 
finds its 011ly solution in the Divine mind , -in u thinker 7l:ose thoughts 
re things , and of ~!hose thoughts and purposes the Porld of f'ini te real -
ity is the continual expression . The finite self is revealed in an 
an a lysis of our knov:.rledge , - as the basal i mplication of our kno\\ledge ; 
for b the self a lone are the elements of experience correlated·t.an d 
unified . I~o :v if our 1.-no'.vl edge be grounded in the Tivine Thinker 
it would naturally follow tha t the finite self (wh ich is irrp li e ~ in all 
.·:nowledge) is also grounded in the Divine :.::i nd and will of the Inf inite 
Self ,. !Dr God. This is the only way open by ·,-hich V" e may ascribe to the 
self an ontological existence. ~e therefore affirm t nat the finite 
self is g rounded. in the infinite Thinker . But what does this i mply a s 
to the relation between the finite self and the infin i te ? Is the f ree 
finite self determined by the infinite? The answre must be Yes , t e 
finite self' is posoted or created, with all its at tributes ancl powers 
by the Infini teSelf. But this creatine is a moral act anr1 for moral 
ends , and hence creation doe s n ot preclud.e such freedom in the finite 
-as is nece s s ary to enable t he f inite s pirit to re a li ze tLe moral pur -
·r- oses for -!hich creation took place . Is the IRfini te Thir:ker eter-
mine d ~~ t~~ or limited by the finite spiri ts ~hich are created? 
The answer must be es , there is a genuine etermination of the creat-
ar ~by the creature . But creation is a free act on the part of the 
6reator,so that any limi t a tion which results is self- limitation . 
:rre freely confess without shame that we cannot un erstand or expl ain 
this free posit ing of the finite by the Infini te increation . ~e af-
firm creation not because we understanc it , but be cause the Absolutists 
alternative of the phenomenality of the fini te, results ' in a disa strous 
dete rmi nation 't'~h ich we have a.uly discounted ; Hhile the lural i stic al -
ternative of an absolut independence of finite spirits , oblit erate s 
the distinction be tween the divine and the human , exalting the finite 
s p irit to all the attributes of the divine 
The difference between our octrine of t he self an that of Green 
i s wider than at first appears . Green has some rat 1er g ood things to 
say in the Prol egomena about all moral progress being through human 
personality and through the a chievement of character . ( ~roleg . p . 2I5-- ) 
But when tested by his theory, .ve learn t hat human personality c an 
mean nothi ng more than the foci a t which the i mpersonal Thought of thl! 
theAbsolute centres itself. mi th human personal i ty grounded metaphys-
ica lly in an :"i.Bsolute v•.'hich is i tself i mpe rsonal and itself colorless 
a s regards moral attributes , it looks very much ~s if the good things 
said can have meaning only "<ihen the finite self is taken a s having & 
far r i cher content than is permitted by the fundamental theory 
For reas ons given we ~eject the conception of the i mpersonal Abs olute 
fo r that of The i sm,-- the Di v i ne Thi nker and ~iller , positing the 
f i n i te s elf freely and for moral purposes hence tr..e r ivine Pers onal 
Thinker . 
Our doctrine of tb.e human self is also to be distinguished from 
i dealistic Pluralisms , like tha t of _rof. Howison . 
It 
that 
The prime fallacy of this book is t he assumption the one :ri v inemind 
as the ground of all reality estroys the freedom of the finite spirit 
and hence human personality demands pluralism i . e . the octrine that 
all minds are coexistent and eternal realities ; t hat i nstead of post-
ulating one basa l Reali ty which is the ground of all finite exi stence 
v1 e must postulate many basa l realities --that our human spirits are 
eternal and uncreated . Of course the great weakness is the fact 
that no a ccount is given of' the existence of these i ndependent minds . 
They are not created by the divine of course as that would sub ordinate 
t h em metaphysically, and , in the author's opinion _ruin their in epend-
ence . Prof .Howison says that finite spirits "have no origin but their 
purely logical one of referenceto each other , including tl1us their 
pri mary reference to God ff . ~ There is noth~ng at all prior to them out 
of which their being arises .11. . t: 7 I They simply ~ and together con~ 
stitute the eternal order . " 
The answer to this kind of doctrine is (I) Pluralists are w!ong in 
supposing that human f' reenom is destroyed by the creation of t he 
finite b y the Infinite for moral ends . (2) Because creation cannot be 
understood is no reason for rejecting it and substituting a t heory 
much more heavily load.ed down with mystery (3) The mind c E-.nnot find 
re s t i n many fund amental existences ontologically in ependent .We shall 
speak of Pluralism again in the foll owint; ch apter .. 
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'.7e sum up then by ffirming that the finite sel f is groun ed in 
the free creation of the Divine for moral ends. The Di vine is indeed 
nlimi ted." by the very f act of creation. The Creator must be thought of 
as standing in relations even of obligation to the creatures whose ex-
istence has dependec on His will. But these relations an any lim-
ita tions which attend them re not imposed on the Divine from without 
but are self- i mposed , and thus the perfect freedom or self-deter min-
ation of the Di vine personality is not therefore inva lidate by crea-
tion. Thus 1·e see that freedom even in the i vine is no lawless or 
arbitrary t~ing. o having freely c osen to ct in a certain way , 
freely bins "S: i mse l f by the outcome of Hi's acts . .. ny underst an ing of 
the I i vine as".!ibsolutely free" or"uncondi tioned'' or "unrelate " is 
aca ~ emic and purely abstract . 
On the other han creation of t e finite by the Infinite oes not 
destroy a proper freedom for the finite, since the creation must be 
thought of as for moral purposes ; and the Divine in thus ca rrying out 
w 
these purposew (e.g. groth of character in the finite spi rit) bestows a 
free om upon the finite, and. by so much freely limits Himself. 
Just h ow this is done we cannot say; and we might as well give over 
all attempts to un erstand creation first as l ast • . e must reject 
mere logical conceptions of t he nAbsolute'' and the "Universal Idea'' 
as wholly inade quate. Any attempt to think of God's nature re-
quires the same regard to the moral that any attempt to think man 's 
nature does. In moral purpose therefore ·e find the key to a rational 
conception of therelation of the free human person and the infinite 
Divine person. 
CHAPTER V. 
THE STRENGTH AND THE VALUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERSONALISM. 
And now it remains to point out the value of this justification of 
and emphasis upon the limited but genuine free~om of the human spirit 
involved in personality. "By their fruits ye shall know them" ap-
plies to philosophical theories. The rational value an cogency of 
any philosophical doctrine is to be tested by the light it a ffo r ds for 
the unde r standing of our human life in its highest interests. 
The doctrine of personalism has already been justifie rationally . 
~ e have tried to show and we think with success that both Naturalism 
and Absolutism f a il as ph&losophies of life. This f a ilure is due to 
their treatment of the human self . Freedom has come forth more and 
more compellingly as an indispensable a ttribute of the finite. 
7-!e have tried the Tieterministic pathway and have found that it leaas 
to both inscrutable mystery and disaster . ·: walk the pathway of per-~ 
sonalism because it promises better t hings. This is not"demonstration" 
to be sure; it is postulation. But let anyone who objects remember that 
rea son can begin only in postulation, and that the rational interests 
of our life are after all the justification of the postulates upon 
which any thought - structure rests. Let us see whether the outcome 
will justify the claim that Personalism will stand the test of life. 
We propose no v therefore to show in this last chapter the value 
and strength of the 'ersonal doctrine for Life. And here some points 
v;hich have already been discussed in the perceding pages will be 
touched on only briefly for the sake of logical completeness in the 
F .c. S . Schiller '"S".Axioms as !'ostulates''· iil}ersonal Idealism is an ex-
cellent exposition of tl1e necessary ·domination of the postulate in all 
rational speculation. 
form of t he argument, while other r·oints will recei:ue more at tent i on. 
(I) Pe rsonality alone plrl'ovides a rational ground for knowledge ancl 
saves us from scepticism. 
This is f amiliar s round: ~."!e know how the Sensational theory of knov.f-
ledge postulat es a purel y passive mind t itself the product of nature, 
hence mouldedinto correspondence with it. e know the inevitable out -
come . ~e have seen how any t heory of d.eterminism wrecks J:.:nowled ge i n 
the end. The or i ginative activity of t he mi nd so necessary to 
the building up o~ knowledge out of the material of sensation is the 
mark of man 's personal real ity . The loom and the t hread are not 
enough to account for the fabric with its pattern; the weaver himself 
i s the most important element. and the marvel is that thinkers could 
have neglected the weaver and ev,en denied his existence. 
(2) Pers onality is the only postulate which enables us to find 
even a partial solution of certain metaphysical problems which other-
wise are absolutely inscl~table. 
(a}Let us take first the problem of Change and Identity. 
The idea of a thing which changes and yet remains id.entical with 
itself presents insurmountable dif ficulties on the i mpersonal plane. 
Take an old faded coat for illustration; its color is not the same as 
when it was first bought. It has shrunk and is therefore smaller in 
size. Other changes have taken place. The crucial question is how can 
the thing remain the same when its qualities change? Yet we know it 
is the same coat which was bought some time ago and has been worn all 
along. There is no need here of setting forth the difficulties in-
valved intrying to find justification for t he identity of a thing 
---·· 
whose qualities change. ~e are familiar with them from our metaphys-
ics. We lmow how futile it is to suppose the"thing itself" remains bhe 
same while its qualities G·. or "states"change,etc. No such "core of 
being"will stand criticism. It is sufficient here to point out that 
change itself cannot exist except for the permanent. Over against the 
ever changing thing there must be permanent being . And the only per-
manent being or abiding existence which stands metaphysical criticism 
is activity; and activity finds no explanation except in an actor (as 
Bradley's chapter on Activity shows). In other words the solution and 
only solution of the puzzle lies in the two words just used- ;E OUR-
SELVES. ? e exist as abiding over against the changing thing and \'le 
knovr it. We postulate the changing thing as remain ing t he same with 
itself throughout the changes . This postulation is a spontaneous act 
of the self,-compelled by nothing outside the nature of the mind 
itself. Thus we s ee that the metaphysical problem of unity in diver-
sity or identity in change (which com:pelle ~1 Mr !l'~dlef t o declare so 
much t o be mer e appear ance) fincls its only solution in the _ ostulate 
of Personality. 
(b)We shall come to a similar conclusio~ in regard to caus lity . 
Here we must simply summarize in a few words the results of our pre-
vious metaphysical study. That one thing can act upon and produce 
change in another thing ,-as for illustration one body s ttracting 
another- is found to be a dark and unintelligible notion on critical 
analysis. r~ view the fact of change and then postulate the princi-
ple of causality as the expl anation . But it does not turn out t o be 
a t all clear what causality means . How can a thing A act on B where 
it is not? or inother words how can a thing transcend itself in bring-
ing about a change outsi de of itself? This is the mystery of causal-
ity. All popular or cmmnon sense notions of "transferring states", 
llpassing influences" Playing forcesn; all attempts to explain by 11 occa-
un 
sionalism" "parallelism" are found on analysis to be critical and use-
less. ~:e have to admit that all attempts at explanation are futile so 
long as -vve try to think of the thin0 s as existing by them.sel ves. 
If thought is to go on at all we are fofce d to postulate some abiding 
ex mstence which stands over agains t the interacting things. 
This ex istence must be active; for \"Je have seen how i mpossible it is 
critically to maintain a being or thing which simply exists . All ex-
istence is knoym by and. consists in activity. This existence must an 
intelligence which by its own spontaneous activity embraces the t wo 
interact i ng things uithin the unity of its own consciousness, compar-
ing judging etc.-hence f ree. Thus we come again to the truth of a 
free self-conscious agent(i .e. a person) There is no meaning to act-
ivity apart from an agent ·who acta ; and there is no explanat ion o£ 
causality apart from activity. Causality as a principle to explain 
sequences in the world of nature, finds its ~only possible i nte r pretat-
ion in the purposes of an Inf inite Agent who wills, and whose pur~oses 
are expressed in the ongoing sequences of nature. 
(c) Personality affords the only solution of the problem of error. 
r:.re have offered the negative side in cri tiaing ::r . Bradley 's dis-
cussion. ':'"e desire now simply to po int out positively that the d.i;:-~i 
tinction bet1,veen truth and error depends on intention or purpose and 
therefore on personality. 
In his very suggestive essay on Error (in personal idealism) 
Mr . Stout elaborates on those cognitive processes, which, while gen-
uine mental acts, yet fall short of being judgments. These , he calls 
by the general name "indeterminate thought~ The mind may think of an 
object without deciding what it is or affirming any predicates of it. 
The thing thought of is then an object of consciousness , but only in-
determinately. In the case of all indeterminate objects of thought, 
the attitude of the mind is interrogative; judgment is for the time 
suspended pending further revelations through sense. 
--~ ow when in this mental attitude we cannot err, for error means a 
definite judgment - an affirmation involving subject and predicate. 
In order for error to be possible, thought must be determinate, i. e. 
must have a de f inite content as regards subject and predicate . 
This leads at once to the only tenable view of error - the only view 
which does not become involved in hopeless confusion. I t is this. 
Error can exist only 1 ·here a judgment has been made which further 
revelation from that objective reality beyong our phychic p'rocesses 
compels us to alter or reverse. Now a judgment is a free mental act . 
If it were not free but determined, then under a set of given circum-
stances all shoul d make the same judgment. Btlt e:;x:perience tells us 
how the opinions ana. beliefs of men vary, even when the data a re the 
same. This variety in belief and opinion is the mark of that independ-
ence or freedom which is characteristic of personality . 
A judgment then is a free act and in its very freedom we find an 
explanation and the only explanation of the fact of error . Given cer-
tain data a:nd som~ minds w;ill__form judgments with .greater care, and 
with wider previous knowledge as a guide . Other minds will form judg-
ments uncritically and carelessly, not willing to pay the price of 
truth by painstaking effort, and ignorantly too, not having sufficient 
knowledge to prevent them from framing judgments which turn out to be 
out of harmony wi th rea lity . But, i t may be asked, is not this very 
ignorance a determination, and does it not invalidate the supposed fre e 
dom in which judgments are made. The answer is No . for the ignorance 
itself has resulted from previous carelessness in the formation of past 
judgments. Error , tnerefore exists when we have formed a judgment 
which, (eith through our carelessness, ignorance , or any other cause) 
subsequent judgments compel us to declare , does nor correspond d th 
reality. Of course we must have the right to take the great aggregate 
of well ve r ified judgments as reality , and test new judgments by the 
established ol ·i ones. If this be denied ( and Bradley denies it) then 
all turns in a circle and the possible tests of truth and error vanish . 
7 e postulate , as we always ~ust , the essential truthfulness of our 
rational experience, and the reality of that part of the worla concern-
ing which our judgments are being constantly verified by each other . 
This is f inite truth - our truth , - ours, not because we create it, 
but because we appropria te it. All those juagments of ours Y>"hich, v;rhen 
tested by this all r eady verified portion of sense experience , fail of 
veri f ication , all those judgments are error . It will be seen 
that error is thus dependent upon the intention , ex i s ting only as the 
result of freely formed judgments. Error is thus bound u p \' i th volit ion 
Indeed in its very natu r e erro; , like evil , epends on the will. Hense 
error is meaningless upon the impersonal plane . Here error and evil 
require the same interpretation. There is no such thing as i mpers onal 
&,1 
evil. Understanding evi l as pain , di sgrace , failure, et c . , i t deman ds 
a reference to consci ousness and will f or its mean ing . So also , in t he 
sense of moral quality of acts, evil can only be predi cated of persons.. 
~e should not think of charging a dog r,v i th a -cr ime, or s upposing that 
he cou l d design evil. ·~e can only make these suppositions of a person. 
So of error. There can be no such thing as i mpersonal error (as Brad ev 
shows). its very existence depends upon Tiill and therefore u~on per -
sonality. To illus trate; If I am wandering aimlessly about a rail roa 
stat ion s impl y k i lling time until the train comes , it makes no differ-
ence which way I turn . I cannot er r so long as I walk about with n o 
definite intentions . But i f I decide to buy a t i cket and want to find 
t he ticket office I shall err in turning to-vvar·i the fre ight - house . 
The problem of error tm h.& .ana--&<~ .fie,... f inite -~:t~l--I;}O;n-.G,l. 
is an insoluble mystery until we see the mean ing of error i n the 
,judc;ment of the free spirit which , for some reason does not harmonize 
with reality . Enough has been sai , I t rust , to establ ish our 
point , and we conclude t hat e r ror can have n o meaning except on the 
pl ane of personal ity. 
(d) Per sonality gives us the only rational conception of t he r elat -
ion between the Inf ini te an d the fin i te , which conserves the highest 
interests of human life • 
. e h ave seen how naturalism, if i t leaves any room f or the Infinite 
at all , represents the Inf inite as the "Unknowabl e" an henc e as equal 
to zero for the purposes of our rational thinki ng. The Unknowable, l ike 
the Ilivine Being i n some :pedrples ' lives , is ca lled. in t o r e quisit ion 
only in the direst extremities . ~e are familiar with the t ruth that t he 
naturalistic dmctrine of the Unknowable equals practical atheism. 
-For Hatural i sm, there is no question of the relation of the Infinite 
to the finite ; it is all finite . 
Abso lutism contains implications whi ch bring it out to resul ts not 
very different . The i dent i f icat ion of all f i nite existenc e wi th the 
Absolute , beaves no room for a reality of the finite and hence permits 
no problem of the r elation of f i n ite and Infi nite.It i s all Infinite . 
Our doctr i ne of ~ersonality affi rms the Inf i nite as pers on; and 
als o the fini te as pers ons . l~ow how· are we to thi nk of the relation 
between these? I f we insist on the freedom of the finite so neces-
sary to personality,is not the infinity of the Infi nite the reby inval-
idated? How relate the Infinite and t he f i nite,in a philosophy which 
rests upon the basal impl i cat ion of personal i ty in both? 
re point out first of all that any cdmception of the finite as 
"made out of"the Infinite i nvolves uncritical not i ons of the Infinite 
...... 
as all embrac i ng substance . Weare past these ~ 
~ 
The question , asked in 
theology whether God ·vas equal to h i mself after creation as well as 
before , we give over as unworthy of philosophical notice. The Infinite 
does not consist in the sum-total of the finites . All ideas of quantity 
or subaance are uncritical . The Infinite is activity . The fin i te also 
if real is activity. How think of the free activity of' the fin ite, and 
the free activity of the Infinite and yet maintain t he finite in its 
proper place as me t ahpys ically dependent on the Inf1ni1be? 
Here ,we are i n deep waters . Our endeavor is not to demons trate , but 
to find a doctr ine which does not deny itself in contradictions no r 
cl.est r oy the trustworthiness of our reason . ~"J e choose the pathv. ay 




negative considerations t!1at a ll other directions brins us to conclu-
sions either os i ti vely disastrous or out of harmony v.ri th a va l uat ion 
of the highest and best interests of our life. 
~e have alrea y indicated what the line of our answer must be , but 
we must point out one ot t wo truths vJhich wi ll forestall ce r t ain ob-
jections to our octrine . ITe~pointout in the f i rst place that in any 
event the t erm free as applied to the Infin i te oes not and c annot 
mean unconditioned or entirel y undetermined . The most it can mean is 
un etermined by anything from wi thout the self. In a certain sense 
even God must be determine d-- but this determi mation is not im:posed on 
Ri m by other aeency than Hi mself . It is a self- dete rm i nat i on . Freedom 
must therefore be taken to mean , the power of an intelligent be i ng to 
choose freely a course of rational action and to choo3e to be govern-
ed thereby Reason is at an end i f 7e s ay that the i vine is uncon-
ditioned an can " do just a s Re pleases", an<l that Di vine means 
"Uncondi tione , 1' or Unre l ated" i nany absolute s ense. The Infinite we 
have seen in out stu dy rnust be an intelligence and a free agent 1hose 
activity expresses moral ends. Thi s being so,the Infinite is condit-
~ 
ioned by R~sown existence -which means by his own f r ee activity . Dis-
cerning this truth will s ave us from a deal of verbal confusion and 
mere f ormal and academic definition of the Infi n i te . 
Then again we affirm the necessity for a bas al mon i s m. Pl uralism 
is uncritica l , and ark metaphysically . The mind cannot rest in it . 
It estroys all re a l dist i nction bet~een the Infinite and the finite . 
':l e must choose between luralism( or the doctrine of many fundamental 
and independent realities ) and monism .dth creat ion , and we choose the 
' tt 
l atter . But we must stop t o point out why we cannot g o ··vi t h the Pl ural-
i s t . 
Prof' Howison in h i s essays nn J3ersonal I dealism sets forth a theory of 
Pl uralism, a nd does s o because he thinks it is the only possible way 
of conserving human freedom . The essay "The Harmony of Determi n ism 
and Freedom" sets forth the pluralistic teaching more clearly than any 
other . Ee s ays , ( p2 23) that the agent in a necessitated worl d. cannot 
be free, unless he is independent of the worlcJ .fJ4h.4'fJ that a free 
be i ng v·ho is re a lly sel f - determining must determi ne both -himself' 
and his worlo , ( p .325} #-,, ·, 1 thateev~ry fre e being must i mpart ar-
rangement to his world from the f orm of h is own act i ve intelli-
gence(p . 325 ) "This principle of cosmic subjection ha s by theists 
always been realized \Vi t h reference to God ; the natural v-;orl d , 
they are always telling us , h oweger ful l of laws to \"lhich ot her 
conscious beings are subject , is completely su~ject t o the mi nd 
and v;ill of God, anc1 its l aws are i mposed u-pon it fro1. His mi nd 
in virtue of hi's creatine it. \ hat we no·v lea rn , and nee to note 
is that t his is just as true of any other being who can be reck-
one l free . If men a re free , then they must be taken a s being log-
ically pri or to na ture ; asbeing its source r a t her than its out-
come." 
I t must be a dmitte , this ki nd of doctrine pretty well effaces 
as created 
the distinction between the human and the Di vine a s Creator . ut tha t 
a f ree being must crea tively determine and that men beine free must 
creativel y determine natu re by no means sc1_uares with our experience . 
-:'"e are q_uite sure that tho world order of our experience \Ve find and 
do not m· .:e . Our author ha s cl one what so many other v1ell meaning per-
sons h ave one - mi staken the log ic al for t he onto loe;ical. ~e o in-
deed create our thou C?"ht - world, but beyon our t h ought - world i s t h e 
·world of thines, not ex isting indepen ently of all thought but cer-
t a i nly capab l e of ex isting inpepen ent l y of our t 1ought . ~~do n ot 
have to choose as Ro·vi son s ays bet· een thinkine of men a s either , 
(I) the outcome of natur e an hence wholly etermine by nature , or 
( 2) tl1e source of nature anc ence Yvholl y etermining it. The r e is a 
thirc1 poss i bi l ity , namely a genuine but partial freedom be stowe . by the 
Creator , its partia na ture due to man 's bodily life which conditions 
h is activity and places limits on his freedom . 
The doctrine of finite spirits a s eternal an unoriginate an as 
c reative l y free is very difficult and unmane.geable. An furthermore it 
violates the eman of the reason fo r basal unity . The ab i ding grounct 
of all re ality must be one not many . 1 0r these reasons we affirm 
monism wi th all its mystery of creation to he vas tly preferable. 
ersonalism has this to say of the Infinite and the finite. 
The Infinite is the ultimate cause or sourc e of the existence of the 
f i n ite. But the Inf'ini te, being a.gent , posits or creates t he f i nite . e 
can furnisl1 no f ormula fo r this proce s s,nor do t:'e hesitate to s ay it 
cannot be understood. by the human mind_. Creation must remain a mys tery. 
But the Infinite being a fr ee a.gent, all creation i s t1:e result of self-
cletermine c1 activity. That vhich is created, or the finite, therefore ex-
presses purpose of the inf i nite, and in this lies the eepest meaning 
of the finite. But in this free creative activity of the infiniet, car-
c ondit ion ing of the Infinite takes place, for no sooner do es God 
crea t e t han t hat v. hich is crea.ted is re l ated to God in .l is eterns.l con~ 
~ciousness. God must there f ore be thought of a s conditioned to some 
degree by His creation,-the Infinite then is determined by the finite. 
But the determination h es had no other orig in than the will of God,-
and is a part of his own c s.rrying out of his purposes. 
This dete rminism is especially marked in t he case of that portion of 
the f inite \'i'hich has been created "in the Divine imagen -i.e. free per-
sons. The source of human freedom is the Divine . It expresses a moral 
purpose of God, namely the achievement of mors.l character by men; and 
this purpose could not be attaine d except by the impartint; of genuine 
freedom by the divine to the human. Personality then is t he 11 divine 
i mage "which men bear. In t his they are like God. Personality is the 
connecting link( f or our thought) between t h e Divine and t h e human. 
That hmnan pers onality limits God insmne ways 11e mus;t a.gain aff irm, 2 0r 
our f reedom t o be true f reedom cannot be negatived by etermination 
by t he Divine. Th is f ree cl.om o:i:' our human personality Vlhich v. e post -
ulate f :LS the deep-lying i mplication of all :philosophy vvhich survives 
is, 'fle r epeat,the expression of -'ivine purpose - namely that we shoul d 
be able rationally to comprehend the worl d (knowledge) ; that >e s h oul d 
achieve character (mora lity) ; and that we should grow into :fitness :for 
ete r nal f ellowship with od (i~~ortality • 
1'Te pass now to the truth that, 
(3)Personality vindicat es Ethics and pr ovides the only f irm r ati on-
al f oundation fo r the mora l lif e of man . 
Our metaphysics ha s t aught us the truth t hat reality is t o be 
thought of not i n terms of "pure being" but of activity. Thfnes d-ono_t 
...._ __ 
just exist , they are wh at they do . Prof . Anc1rey~ Seth well says that 
the basal philosophical axiom for today is not Descartes' "Cogito ergo 
sum" but rather "Ago ereo sum" . ~?e do well not to fors::et this when we 
think of personality and the moral life . Our existence as we have 
seen, is grounded in the moral purpose of the Infinite . Our moral li f e 
and char acter which is its ripe fruit thervfore expresses Divine pur-
pose . All action which leads to character must be rational i . e . 
mot i ved ; -theremust be -purpose . ~ 0\'T a motive as He have s een in our 
previous analysis is without meaning except &s it involves the f ree 
a ctivity of the finite spirit present i ng to itself an idea of itself 
enjoyine the object d~ s ire d . This presente i ea or motive is the i m-
pellant. S'hether -v:e t h ink with ::9r . !.1art i neau that tl1e mora l judgment 
a rises fr om a comparison of motives , or ari ses froma rational cal cu-
lation of probable conse quences , or from the soul ' s re cogni tion of the 
autl1ority of certain i deals which are g iven ana not deducible ,- -what -
evervie-..-: we take , the moral judgment rests upon the i mplication of our 
fre edom. There is no justification whatever f or affirming merit or 
demerit , for the i · ea of responsibility , for the i mposing of penalties 
unl ess the ethical juc1gment s from which mora l ac t ion a rises are free , 
i .e. the judgments of a person , not a consc ious automaton . 
1 ft er all we may s ay, n ot only that the freedom of the human spirit 
provides t h e only r ational f oundation for Ethi cs , but conversely that 
the mo r a l li f e of man reveals the personal s elf . In mor a l acti on ,-- in 
doing thingswhich we lrnow·express ·our worthy purposes , v e discover 
ourselves . An d here our mora l failures a lso testi fy to the dis nity 




in the recognition of t he great difference betwe en our noblest pur-
poses an our best reali zations , in our self- ju gments and s elf-con-
demnations , - v.;e learn of that true s elf of y.;hich t_le out ·var c oncrete 
action s een by others often reveals but little. Morally no less than 
epistemologically can we o a s Hume proposed to do, f ind the self out -
side of the k ingdom of selfnood . 
To the narrow Je1ish r abbis, isputing as to how r i ghteousness is to 
be known , Jesus said , "he that ills to o shall knov, . ~1oral experience 
is t he highest court :;.'or the ecis ion of the questions involving the 
mo r a l interests of the finite spi r it. dill to do an ~ e shall kno ;-
that is to say , action which springs from judgment s g iven by the self 
to the self' , ·ii ll a f or t h e knowledge neede d to discern truth :f:'rorn 
error, r i ghteousness from unri ghteousness. 
(4} Personality a lone makes a pl a ce for eligion. 
e understan by religion , the Tihole response rna e by the human 
spirit to the revelations of the Di vine ersonal pi r i t . 
Natural i sm f inds no pl ace fo r reli~ ion . The only Go Naturalism kno 7s 
is the i mper sonal "Unknowable" define interms of Force . Thi s God such 
as it is Naturalism postulates because hen presse by Metaphysics 
some such postulation becomes necessary • . .,..e do not dispute the legit-
imacy of the postulati on itself , but onl y of what is postul ate • 
Our present c oncern is vvith t h e just i fication of r elig i on . It i s clea r 
t hat an i :n erson"".l "Unknov able" can make no revelation o:: itself· nor 
- . 
c •"' n l':e f ind out an:y-thing ab out such an existence (even al lo v- i ng t a t we 
can know that such an existence exists .) There can be there i:'ore no 
relations between t he Infinite so c onc e ive d and the f i nit e. The onl~ 
Q l 
atti tu e concei v ble is that of i gnor, .nt a~;ve . Of course this leaves 
no pl ace fo r freedom . Naturalism ignores personality completely. 
I n Prof . Shal er 's l)ook " The Inc1 i vi ual " ( I90I) we _lave a most el aborate 
bi."l\'\ S~ lf-
reduction of human personality to zero by one who frankly confesses 
1' 
a mater i al ist. The purpose of the ~. iscussion is evidently to _present 
a rationa l anc scientific conception of the human indi vi c,u al, not as an 
en in himse1f hut as a unit in the mass . The whole emphasis of value 
is put upon t __ e race ·,' um n i ty , soc i ety , an man . The fall acy of the 
universal is foun on nearl y every paee . 1::'e n ee pass no further c r i t-
icism u;:>on the book t 1an to c:uote a single short sent ence :-
"The discreet naturalist would answer , /' ,, {.'that in the processes of re -
pro uction all tp.e --~~erience of the antecedent li f e, is passed over 
fron one generation to ~mo ther , over wh at ·1e may term a molecula r 
bridge''(p.304 ) In this book Prof . Shaler has define in ivi cuality 
as the localization f or the time of movements i n matter ,( p . 70) 
As for the :Civine,he has the logical ecency to leave that out al to -
Gether . In the chapters on Attitu e to Leath , 01 ge , anc ID~ortality 
v1e h ave the best that naturalism can d.o for the longines nd heart -
hungers of the hum n spirit . But the book fin s no place for od, per-
sonality or religion. ~nd this is characteristic of ~ turali sm 
generally 
And bsolutism is no better in this particul- r . Indeed t _e re is a 
striking and fatal parallelism between ~bsolutism anc raturalism w_en 
compare as regards their value in providing a philosophy of rel i g ion . 
Naturalism regards the human inaivu u a l as the locali zat ion for the 
time of movements in rnatter(Shaler1 . Absolutism regarcls umsn per s ons 
as the centres or f oci at · ~ich the i mpersonal li fe of the Absolut e 
Thought temporarily concentrat es itself.(G-reen) retural ism has no 
:Di vine hut t h e metaphysica l abstract iOll Of the i mperS0118l ITU11}:-nowable IT 
an · bsolut i sm bids us bow a t the pre sence of tl1e i mpersonalnAbsolute n 
\".'h i ch hs s n o moral a ttributes an cannot be knovm . It is hard l y n 
necessary to point out tha t a pantheistic -'octrine of an i mpersonal 
Inf i nite cuts the heart out of reliGion . ~orship becomes i~~ ossiblc. 
':':'"h o can feel e r a titude to a spiritua l principle? ;:ho c an love or rev-
erence ~n exist ence that neither feels nor loves? The very essence of 
relif, iOn is the s elf- surren er of the human to the :Di vine . . Iow is this 
Dossiol e or even conceivable if all on the human ~lane be determined? 
And to whom is the surrender to be ma~e? Approach edfrom the practical 
si de of t h e possibility of religious worship (a common and un ivers a l 
a ttitu\e of the human spirit ) , Absoluti sm again reveal s it s p overty ; 
for in it s false attempt to i enti fy the divine an the human , the 
realit y of both is destroye • 
In t he s ection on the mean ing of t he self , Je have spoken of the 
t wo elements in the fi nite sel f , the universalistic an the i n ivi dual-
i stic. The forme r provi de s f or the inclusion of man '.':i t h in a universe 
of a ll self-conscious existences ; the latter pr ovidesfor h i s , distinct 
ion f rom it , as an i n i vidua l be i ng . Now this tvvo - fold. meani ng of t h e 
self isimportant i n consi ering the bas is of religi on . In order that 
there may be a revelati?n .of t he ~v~l!-e.to t h e human , an r; ::esponse 
: roD the human to the Dl Vlne , the ~nf lnlte self an the fl n lte s el f 
mus t be s eparate consc i ous existences , an each must contain b oth the 
universa l and t h e un i que elements . The universal ele·rnent a ssures the 
possibility of the ..:.; i v i ne beint:; able to share i n the c onsc i , usness of 
the human , an on the other hand of the human , in its grovling conscious 
ness being ab l e to at tain to so. e com rehension of the ~ivine. 
The Divine can mean nothing to t he human unle s t ere be cm:1~nuni t y of 
nature such that t h e ..... i vine se l f corre s pon s to t .. e human self , and 
unless al s o the highest mora l at tributes of the human se l f are con-
ceive d by the human self as a ttribut es a l s o of the -i v i ne , 1)ut in a 
perfect det:;ree . In other TIOr s ,i f rel i g ion is to be possib e , the r iv-
ine life must contain the human , anct conver sely t ~e human mu st cont in 
elements of tl1e Di vine . Thus the di v i ne vill be knowaole an a cces -
si'ble . an t he essent i al and et ernal v:orth of the human r;Jill be a s -
sure • 
The b earing of this upon person lity as the e s sentia l pre re qu isit e 
of r elig ion will be apparent . Relisio~e quires that there b e a per-
son~ l God an personal creatures if there is to be a commun i t y or 
mut uality i n tJ:1ought and purpose and love . 
The ab ove discussion leads al so to the truth of the Div ine atherhoo· 
- t he message of Chr istianity . I t i s i mplie d in fatherhoo d t hat the 
offspring and pa rent be essentially lik e in natur e. The father 's con-
sc ious life and the son 's conscious li f e wl1ile not identic a l corres-
p on( closely . arent and offsprine must be the s ame i n rin • 
Thus rel i gion does indeed demand t he uni on of the human with the 
Di v i ne , but it is not the att empted un ion of a false etaphysica l 
i dent i ty , but rather the un ion of community and commun ion,-the un ion 
\ 
of persons , 1vho enjoy a community of thought , purpose anc. love . This is 
the Hi gher Pantheism 
"Dark is the world. to thee; thyself art the reason why; 
For is He not all but thou , that hast pov-er to feel"I am I"? 
Speak t o Hi m thou for He hears , and spirit with spirit can meet ,-
Cl oser is He than breathi ng t and nearer than han.s and f eet." 
It {Ould be possible to go on and show hov empty nd eani ngl ess 
the fundamental aoctr i nes of religion are , when men are thought of as 
anything l ess than f ree personal spi rits , but that woul carry us too 
far afield and beyon the limits of the present discussion i nto theol-
ogy . It will be permitted h mvever brie fly to suggest one or two 
points in this direction . 
The I ncarnat ion shows us the Di vine revealing Hi mself to men a s a 
·:rinite~or the time) being , or inother words as a human personality . 
And i f the Creat or i s to be knovn by his creation , then the Incarna-
tion reveals to us the Divine s o aki n in nature to the human that he 
willingly and freely lives the human life, taking it upon Hi mself , 
and i dentifyi ng mims elf ;:v i th human i nt erests and tasting to i ts .. regs 
the cup of human exper i ence . Of course there is mystery here , but the 
point is that apart from the personal view , all is meaningless . 
Sin and Salvation f i nd meaning onl y as we regard men as personal 
spirits akin to Go • The universal element i n finite personal i ty 
minds all men together in the community of actg,.-.ities and i nterests , 
and involves us i n relations ,,. i th the wh ole fin i te universe an with 
the J)ivine . · hile the individualistic el ements in our personalit y 
mieht tempt us to thi nk that each liveth unt o himsel f , the universal 
istic utterl y forbids: such belief. :bundamental therefore to a sense 
of obligation and therefore to a sense :-> f sin , i'hen th ·.t obligation 
ha s been v iolated , is this consciousness of our involvemen+ with a 
spiritual an moral order , at the head of which is the supreme Mora l 
:f:'erson. The consciousness of sin emerges ·vhen i e come to recognize 
our own purposes and freeactions as out of harmony vith the purposes 
of God And the intensity of this conviction will depend upon the dis-
tinctness with which Yl e apprehend (I )G8d' s moral purposes as expressed 
in Hi s kno~vn ;,7ill , and (2) that our o rn acts o not coincide with 
tha t , ill . The root of sin therefore lies in the \"lill of men , an its 
essence is a refusal by the free finite self to surrenL er the self to 
God . Or aw Schleierrnacher has it "sin is self- seeking or selfishness" . 
It will be seen at once that only with the fullest recognition of 
pe rsonality, both human and di uine , does sin and therefore salvation 
from it f i nd meanine . 
A third and last application of our philosophy as providing the only 
basis for religion is seen in Immortality 
The Immortal Hope is meaningless , except in the light of 
personality. 
It is useless now to speak either of Naturalism or Absolutism. 
They have no words for"thehour v. hen the immortal hope burns low in 
the heart" P 
Prof. James in his "Human Immortality"( I 898) has set forth a 
theory which may be described as the grafting of a branch from bsol~ 
ute Idealism on the Naturalistic trunk . In a wo r d his theory is t hat 
the brain is not creative of conscious life , but transmissive . 
Material things and the whole natural order mask the one infin i te 
Reality which is the sole ground of the _reality of finite . streams of 
consciousness 1!t e call our private selves . ( p;;I5) Through the brain as 
transmitter , gleams of eternal light come from"the great mother sea of 
reality beyond" 
Now all t h is is in vain so far a s the immortal hope is concerned . 
For , for religion at any rate , nothing short of the i mmortality of the 
self as self can be admitted as worthy of consideration. If the brain 
be the transmitter of conscious life to the individual from the"great 
mother sea of reality" , what happens to the individual \vhen the trans-
mitter is broken? The immortal hope demands assurances of the contin-
uance of the consciousn life of the self, after that material instru-
ment which we call the body has fallen a\"lay . Here of all places it 
· I lJ i is useless to a ttempt to feed our hearts with abstractions • . ~'hat com~J 
in the thought that the"race " or "mankind" has lived f or countless 
agew and may live for countless ages to come ! nThe race'' exists only 
in the thought of conscious beings vn1o apparently pass away . 7hen it 
is a question of existence , we must never forget that it is not the 
universal but the individual which is real . Prof.Howison in his 
essay on Immortality (in Li mits of Evolution)puts it rightly when he 
says: "The real st ing of death is the apprehension of each of us that 
he may perish in dying; and no hope of the changeless persistence of 
any Eternal Consciousness , divine or other , can afford us any consol-
a tion, if this drea of our own personal extinction be not set a t resJ 
The question of immortality is therefore that of personal i mmortality 
or the persistence of the self after p1ys ica l eath . No other immor-
tality is worth t a lking about . How now does the octrine of 
~ersonal ism give the i mmortal hope strength? 
In our metaphysical study we have seen ho~n opaque and inexplic ,bl e 
certa in notions are without the personal self. 'Je saw t hat without the 
self permanence vs. chance \as an impenetrable mystery. Athing tha t 
changes is the 11 Same" thing only by virtue of a permanent self ~.vhich , 
standing over against the changing states of the thing ,relates them , 
ana postulates the i dent ity of the thing amid all its changes~ Change 
is meaningless except for the permanent and abiCting. 
lifow our bodies are material things , subject to continua l change . 
7 e a re conscious of great changes in them as ·the years go on. lmost 
eve r y sense- ciual i tychanges i n the course of a life-time. It would puz-
the uncritica l man of common sense to justify his own i dentity through 
forty or f ifty yea rs of physical change. Th scientist would make it 
clear to him that every material particle in his body had been re -
placed six or seven times . His al).swer would probably be, But I knov1 
that Iam the same person and have been all al ong , and this answer 
would be the right one . Back of a ll materi~l change, is the at i ing 
personal spirit ,-which knows itself as abiding . The body is the mater-
i a l instrument of this spirit , and , as over against all change which 
time and disease may bring about , this spirit continues to know its elf 
a s abid.ing through all the succession of changes. This i s t he mystery 
and glory of personal s elfhood. 
And now it is but another step to suggest that if the self has 
known i t self as abiC..ing throughout the very considerable changes ·.;~hich 
have t aken place in its material instrument-the body ;v.rill not the self 
know i tself as ab i ding through that final change i n the soul's in-
strument , which men call death? 
-But the answer may be , Yes but that final change in the bod.y is 
it s a.estruction . The harper c an make music Yi i th a harp -r.rhich grors ol d 
and gets playerl out: but the harper can make no music t w~th h is harp 
when the stri ngs have snapped and the sound- board is broken . Tl1e re-
joinder would be True , but who shall say that the harper ..,. ill not 
make music and nobl er mus ic, vv i t h a new harp ! 
fhrough all materi a l changes i n our phys ica l organism, t he con-
scious personal spirit asserts i t self as abiding , and upon t his rests 
the whole s tructure of our rat ional li e . This is a lofty h eight 
whi ch philos ophy has ~~~~ined only aft er much l abor ious climb i ng of 
thought , through many many years . And from these heights,we may look 
over , and through t he mi sts , catchglimpses n ow and again of a conscious 
personal life beyond. 
Similar s t renr;thenings of the i mmorta l hope c ome t o us when we 
consider that uni versalistic element i n the finite self which v;e have 
pointe d out as its bond of uni on and kinship with the Inf inite . 
Personalit y- - that which distinguishes men fr om all ot her consc ious 
beings ,is the mark of the divine in the human ,- the " i mage of God" . 
r. e are "sons of God" because \·1e are l ike God in our nature . 
Now we have seen that the most di stinctive mark of the personal is 
freedom ; and that f reedom means determi nati on by nothing outsi de the 
self. I s not our i mmortality therefore the i mpl i ca tion of our whole 
personal philosophy? re to be det ermined by the l ast physical change? 
Our pe r sonal ity -our k i nship wi t h God bids us answe r No . By that 
fre edom, -that abiding sel fl1.ood which is the mark of our sp iritual li±'e 
i n Him, v1e answer , It cannot be . 
"Till Death us · join , 
0 vo ice yet mor e Di v ine! 
That to the broken heart breathes hope sublime ; 
Through lonely hours 
~nd shattered powers 
~e still are one , despite of change and time . 
Death with his healing hand , 
Shall once more kni t the band , 
~hich needs but that one link uhich none may sever ; 
Till t hrough the 6nly Good, 
Heard,felt , and underst oo d , 
Ou r life in God shall make us one forever . 
Inreply to the question, do you regard this as a demonstrat i on of 
I mmortal i tJr? we ansv;er No. I mmortal ity is not 11 demonstrated"by phil-
osophy. It i s too l arge a truth f or t hat . Philosophy cannot demonstra 
God, nor causality , n or identity, :ijor the self! And no philosopher wh o 
understands h i ms elf tries to or wishes to . The personal self, the 
personal God, the life of the spi r it , - these are great truths wh ich , 
like mountain- peaks emerge more and more clearly out of t h e mi st s and 
shadows , as phil osophic thought fre es i tse lf from the uncritical pre-
judices of sense . and the fallacies i t has i mposed upon itself t hrough 
the inherent wealmesses of language , and the shadows cast by i ts o·rm 
log ical processe s . 
In this l e.rger assurance vvhich grows out of .life i tself we r est ;-
content to know that if the natural world is to be intelligible,. an d 
if our human li f e is to have a deeper meaning , i t can be onl;'l through 
t h ese majestic truths ih ich ground the present and f leet i ng in t he 
Eternal and Ab i ding. 
I CONCLUSION . 
·;r; e began our discus.sion with the conviction that phil osophy us t 
concern i t sel f with our human li fe . That only as philosophy br ings 
some l i ght , and affords some guidance in the comprehension of the 
\vorld and our existence in it , is it worthy the name and the effort . 
~e bring the discussion to a close with the conviction that only as 
philosophy takes as its key-word , Personal ity--t he freeli fe of the 
spir it , can i t remai n true to its high calling . 
personality ni the human is a capacity , a promise rather tlan a 
full real i zation. Weknow how incompl ete is the structure of human 
knowledge , and how imperfectly the moral Ideal is realized i n the 
stormy conflict s of human pass ion and selfishness·. But the freel i fe 
of t he spirit gives us the Vision and enables the pure i n heart to 
s ee God , in ~·hom personal i ty is a perfect ion , an an Ideal . The problem 
of life i s the realization or incarnatllon i n the human,of the Ideal 
and the :Divine . The s addest tragedies o " life come from ignor i ng 
and desp ising thi s fre e life of the Spirit-which is the glo r ious 
birth- rieht of those wh o have been created " sons of' God~ nd the no-
blest spirits are those who l1ave live d and love d and labored con-
stantly to give t h is div ine gi ft its freest and highest use . 
Personality--the value of men-is the word of emancipation for an 
age of shabby materi alism in thought; when me are too often me as -
ured by the values of t hings , and when the commercial spir it tends to 
i mpose the c.ead level of material c ommonplaceness upon al l spheres 
of activity . 
Personality--the t rans cendent worth of t h e free spirit- is the 
word f or an age ·which shows a tendency to trust in crystali zed insti-
-tutions and forms as ends i n themse lves . 
Personality - - the only real i nlife £reel~~ expressing i tself ,- i s 
t h e word fo r Art , that the chief valuation may not be pl a c ed on 
mechanic al dexterity , or technic al cleverness , but on earnest i nter-
pretation of life thruoeh the giving of the self; t h is mus t be t he g 
goal of all truly artistic endeavor . 
Personal i ty --the inestimable worth of the soul of man- is the 
word for theology and religion , that they may keep close t o sorrowi ng 
s inning men, bringing a message of life and love from the Et erna l 
Father , whose will is that all His children shall be sp i r i tually 
free i n "the e lor ious libe r ty of the s ons of God" 
The conditi ons our physic al existence i mposes are a nec essary 
bondage to "the crea ture" , hnlding us down and prevent i ng our free 
spirits from findi ng t heir full f'reec1om. We know too well that our 
f re edom is at best a partial fre edom ; and therefore that personalit y 
on the human pl ane is but i mperfectl y realized . 
Bu t t he reality of personality even within these limits , · oi nts to 
the fullness of liberty , ancl to the completion of t hat divine 
b i rth- r i ght which we already enjoy; and assures us t hat , nwhen Ie 
shall appear ,we shall be like Him, for we shall see Hi m as He is" . 
